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ABSTRACT—Article III’s diversity jurisdiction provisions extend the
federal judicial power to state law controversies between different states or
nations and their respective citizens. When exercising diversity jurisdiction,
the federal judiciary does not function in its usual role of protecting federal
interests or ensuring the uniformity of federal law. Instead, federal courts
operate as alternative state courts for resolving disputes between diverse
parties. But federal courts often cannot act as alternative state courts
because of Article III justiciability doctrines such as standing, ripeness, and
mootness. These doctrines define when a federal court may act. But they do
not apply to state courts. Rather, states have developed their own
justiciability doctrines that substantially diverge from the federal ones. The
consequence is that federal courts sitting in diversity cannot hear many
claims that can be brought in state court and can hear other claims that state
courts lack the power to decide. This Article argues that, instead of
applying federal justiciability doctrines, federal courts should apply state
justiciability doctrines to state law cases brought under diversity
jurisdiction. Following state justiciability doctrines would better achieve
the goals of allowing federal courts to function as alternative state courts.
Moreover, following state justiciability doctrines in state law cases would
not undermine the rationales underlying federal justiciability doctrines
because those doctrines were developed to limit the federal judiciary’s
ability to interfere with the other branches of the federal government—
concerns that are inapplicable in state law disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
Every year, tens of thousands of suits are filed in federal court based
on diversity jurisdiction.1 The primary reason for federal diversity
jurisdiction is to provide an alternative forum for resolving state law claims
free from the bias that state courts might harbor against out-of-state
litigants.2 Thus, when exercising diversity jurisdiction, the federal judiciary
1

See U.S. District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/
us-district-courts.aspx [http://perma.cc/87ZZ-5NUX] (noting that in 2012, 85,742 suits were filed based
on diversity of citizenship). Diversity of citizenship is the most common basis for federal jurisdiction
after “Federal Question” jurisdiction. Id. This number includes only suits between citizens of different
states; it does not include suits presenting other forms of diversity, such as suits between a state and a
citizen of another state.
2
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (justifying diversity
jurisdiction on the ground that “state attachments . . . might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 534
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (describing diversity jurisdiction as necessary
because the “state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased” against out-of-state
litigants). According to some, the fear of bias was limited not only to state judges, but also included
state juries. See Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 997 (2007).
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does not function in its usual capacity as a coequal branch of the federal
government. Instead, federal courts operate as an alternative forum to the
state courts, resolving disputes between different states or nations and their
respective citizens.3 In that role, as the Supreme Court has explained, the
federal court is simply “another court of the State.”4 Its function is to
interpret and enforce state law as any other court of that state would.5
But federal courts sitting in diversity often cannot act as alternative
forums to state courts because of federal justiciability doctrines.6 Deriving
from the “case” or “controversy” language from Article III,7 these doctrines
include standing, mootness, ripeness, the political question doctrine, and
the prohibitions on hearing collusive suits and issuing advisory opinions.8
They define the circumstances under which a federal court has the power
under Article III to hear a dispute9—including a dispute brought under
diversity jurisdiction.10
Imposing federal justiciability requirements in diversity cases impairs
the federal courts’ ability to serve as an alternative state forum. Article III
does not apply to state courts, and state courts consequently need not
follow federal justiciability doctrines.11 Instead, states have developed their
own justiciability doctrines that substantially differ from the federal ones.
The application of federal justiciability doctrines to suits in diversity thus
causes a divergence between state courts and federal courts: Although
federal courts sitting in diversity are supposed to function as state courts,
they cannot hear some claims that a state court can hear, and they can hear
other claims that a state court cannot.
3

For purposes of this Article, the term “diversity jurisdiction” refers to the federal courts’ power
under Article III to hear “Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State; . . . between
Citizens of different States; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
4
Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945).
5
See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine,
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law . . . .”).
6
See infra note 132 (collecting examples).
7
See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“The doctrines of [justiciability]
originate in Article III’s ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ language . . . .”).
8
See Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 76–77 (2007) (cataloguing
doctrines).
9
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 754 (1976) (“[A]ll concepts of justiciability . . .
derive[] from . . . the ‘cases or controversies’ limitation imposed by Art. III.”).
10
See, e.g., Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissing claim
brought under diversity because plaintiff failed to demonstrate federal standing); see also Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts,
69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448 & n.6 (1994) (noting that federal courts apply federal justiciability
doctrines to suits brought under diversity jurisdiction).
11
See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often
that . . . state courts are not bound by . . . federal rules of justiciability . . . .”).
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Although scholars have written extensively on federal justiciability
doctrines,12 none have examined whether these justiciability doctrines
should apply to suits in diversity.13 This Article takes up that challenge. It
argues that federal justiciability doctrines should not apply to state law
disputes brought under diversity jurisdiction. Instead, federal courts sitting
in diversity should apply state justiciability doctrines.
Following state justiciability law would better achieve the primary
goal of diversity jurisdiction: providing an alternative forum for resolving
state law claims free from potential state court bias against out-of-state
litigants. It would also increase parity between the state and federal
courts.14 As the Court explained in the context of Erie v. Tompkins,15 for a
federal court to serve as an alternative to state court in suits brought under
diversity jurisdiction, parties must have the same substantive rights in the
federal court as they do in state court.16 Following federal instead of state
justiciability requirements in suits brought under diversity jurisdiction
undermines that goal because it results in federal and state courts having
different scopes of power to enforce rights. To be clear, my claim is not
that Erie extends to justiciability. Erie is limited to questions of substantive
law,17 and modern justiciability doctrines are not substantive law.18 But the

12

See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 244–67 (2002) (discussing the
evolution of political question doctrine); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J.
221 (1988) (criticizing standing); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of
Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603 (1992) (criticizing mootness); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1365–71 (1973) (arguing for more expansive
justiciability); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 160 (1987)
(criticizing ripeness); Siegel, supra note 8, at 122–38 (criticizing federal justiciability doctrines).
13
Scholars have explored the converse question whether state courts should apply federal
justiciability doctrines when hearing federal questions. See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or
Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263,
265, 282–304 (1990) (arguing that state courts should be bound by federal justiciability doctrines when
hearing issues of federal law); Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257,
1291–96 (2011) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisdiction should extend to all state court determinations
of federal law that are adverse to the claimed federal right).
14
By parity, I mean the equal ability of federal and state courts to enforce state law. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1991) (defining parity between
two courts as including an equal ability to enforce rights).
15
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16
Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945) (“[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a
State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in
effect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made
unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the
State.”).
17
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine,
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law . . . .”).
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same concerns underlying Erie apply to questions of justiciability, and state
justiciability doctrine therefore should inform the meaning of the term
“controversies” in Article III for state law suits brought under diversity
jurisdiction. In other words, although what constitutes a controversy is a
question of constitutional law, federal courts should look to state law to
give meaning to that constitutional term.
Following state justiciability doctrines in state law suits brought under
diversity jurisdiction would also not conflict with the rationales underlying
federal justiciability doctrines. The two main reasons for federal
justiciability doctrines are to protect the separation of powers and to ensure
adverseness sufficient to frame the dispute for the court.19 But separation of
powers concerns generally do not apply to state law cases brought under
diversity jurisdiction because the powers of the other branches of the
federal government are not implicated in those disputes.20 Nor do concerns
about sufficient adverseness warrant following federal instead of state
justiciability doctrines. State law should dictate the degree of adverseness
necessary to warrant adjudication of state law claims.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by providing an
overview of federal justiciability law and contrasting that law with state
justiciability doctrines. It then explains how these differences have resulted
in federal courts sitting in diversity refusing to hear claims that could be
brought in state court. Part II makes the affirmative case for following state
justiciability rules in state law diversity cases. It explains that following
state justiciability doctrines is consistent with the text of the diversity
provisions in Article III and better achieves the principal purpose
motivating those provisions—to avoid state court bias against out-ofstaters—than the current practice of following federal doctrines. It also
explains that, although Erie does not apply by its terms to justiciability,
many of the same reasons supporting the requirement that federal courts
apply state substantive law in diversity cases apply to justiciability as well.
Part III explains why the justifications for federal justiciability doctrines do
not apply to cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. Part IV addresses
various other concerns with applying state justiciability doctrines in

18

For an argument that, if justiciability is substantive, federal courts should apply state
justiciability doctrines when sitting in diversity, see F. Andrew Hessick, Standing in Diversity, 65 ALA.
L. REV. 417 (2013).
19
See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (explaining that justiciability serves the two
roles of “limit[ing] the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and . . .
assur[ing] that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government”).
20
Of course, state lawsuits may implicate separation of powers if they are brought against
particular parties, such as the United States.
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diversity cases and explains why none of those concerns justify following
federal justiciability doctrines in those cases.
I.

JUSTICIABILITY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

A. Federal Justiciability Doctrines
Article III empowers the federal courts to exercise the “judicial
[p]ower”21 to hear nine categories of cases and controversies.22 The
Constitution does not define cases and controversies, and the Convention
provides little insight into their meaning.23 Instead, the Court has provided
meanings to those terms on a case-by-case basis through a common-lawlike process that focuses on the appropriate role of the judiciary in the
federal system.24
Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed a variety of complex
justiciability doctrines to determine when a dispute constitutes a case or
controversy under Article III.25 These doctrines include the requirements
that plaintiffs have standing,26 that their claims be ripe27 and not moot,28 that
21

U.S. CONST. art. III § 1, cl. 1.
The nine categories are:
[(1)] Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . [(2)] Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; . . . [(3)] Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; . . . [(4)] Controversies to which the United States will be a party; . . . [(5)]
Controversies between two or more States;[ (6) controversies] between a State and Citizens of
another State;[ (7) controversies] between Citizens of different States;[ (8) controversies] between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and [(9) controversies]
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
23
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND] (recounting James Madison’s statement that it was “generally supposed that the
jurisdiction given” in Article III “was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature”).
24
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (acknowledging that Article III “concepts have gained
considerable definition from developing case law”); U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,
401 (1980) (“[J]usticiability doctrine[s] [are] of uncertain and shifting contours.” (quoting Flast, 392
U.S. at 97)); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503–04 (1961) (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Court
“evolved” the various justiciability doctrines); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in
Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes
Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1327 (2005) (stating that courts “fabricated” justiciability
doctrines); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (acknowledging
that defining the terms “cases” and “controversies” requires resort to “common understanding of what
activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992))).
25
See Ullman, 367 U.S. at 504 (explaining that the Court “evolved” the various justiciability
doctrines); Siegel, supra note 8, at 76–77 (cataloguing the various justiciability doctrines).
26
See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (dismissing for lack of
standing).
27
E.g., Ullman, 367 U.S. at 508 (dismissing for lack of ripeness).
28
E.g., Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 733 (2013) (dismissing for mootness).
22
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plaintiffs are not requesting an advisory opinion29 or seeking the resolution
of a political question,30 and that their suits are not collusive or otherwise
nonadversarial.31 Although grounded in Article III, these doctrines are only
loosely connected to that provision; indeed, many of these doctrines began
as rules of judicial self-restraint and were tied to Article III only in the
twentieth century.32 The only apparent exceptions are the prohibition on
advisory opinions and the political question doctrine. Early refusals to issue
advisory opinions invoked Article III,33 and early references to the political
question doctrine grounded it in the role of the judiciary under Article III.34
The theory underlying most of the federal justiciability doctrines is
that the function of federal courts is to provide remedies for violations of
rights.35 Under this “dispute resolution” model,36 the role of the federal
courts is not to expound on constitutional or other legal questions or to
police the other branches of government.37 Courts may engage in these
functions, but only in the course of resolving a dispute arising from the
violation of rights.38
Standing provides an example of this view of dispute resolution. For a
plaintiff to have standing, he must demonstrate that he has suffered, or
imminently will suffer, a concrete and personal injury to a legal interest;
that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and that a court can redress the injury through a favorable decision.39 Under
these requirements, an individual has standing to seek a remedy only for
harm to herself; she cannot sue to complain about illegal action that did not
29

E.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (“[A] federal court has [no] power to render
advisory opinions . . . .”).
30
E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (dismissing for political question).
31
E.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 360–61 (1911) (dismissing suit for lack of
adversity).
32
Hall, supra note 13, at 1267 (“[C]ourts dismissed [non-justiciable] cases using language
suggesting an exercise of discretion.”).
33
See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (suggesting that Article III prohibited a scheme
under which the Secretary of War reviewed judicial determinations of veterans benefits).
34
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that, because the
Constitution commits them to another branch, political questions “can never be made in this court”).
35
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492 (2009) (“Article III of the Constitution restricts
[the judiciary] to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts [of] redress[ing] or prevent[ing] actual
or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by . . . violation of law.”).
36
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 72 (6th ed. 2009).
37
Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1365; Siegel, supra note 8, at 77.
38
See Summers, 555 U.S. at 492 (“Except when necessary in the execution of that function, courts
have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action.”); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1965) (“Federal courts . . . pass on constitutional
questions because . . . they must decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction . . . .”).
39
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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cause her harm.40 According to the Supreme Court, these requirements
ensure that the judiciary stays within its “province of . . . decid[ing] on the
rights of individuals.”41
The other theory underlying federal justiciability is the “special
functions” model.42 This model rejects the notion that the role of federal
courts is solely to remedy violations of rights; instead, it posits that the
judicial function also includes articulating constitutional values and
ensuring government compliance with the law.43 Thus, unlike the dispute
resolution model, the special functions model would extend standing to
citizens concerned about illegal government action.44 The model does not
claim that the courts may perform these law-articulating and enforcement
functions at any time; federal courts still may act only to resolve a case or
controversy by entering a judgment binding parties to the suit.45 But what
constitutes a case or controversy—the occasions for entering those
judgments—is broader.46
Although the dispute resolution model underlies most federal
justiciability doctrines, several doctrines rest on the special functions
model.47 One example is the “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception to mootness.48 That exception allows a court to hear a claim that
is otherwise moot if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant will
again engage in the complained-of conduct.49 The exception does not exist
to vindicate private rights; plaintiffs in such cases receive no relief for the
violation of their rights. Instead, the purpose of the exception is to clarify
the law and deter future violations.50
Despite their differences, both the dispute resolution model and special
functions model agree that justiciability involves the question of the federal
court’s appropriate role with respect to the other branches of government.
Both balance considerations of when the federal courts should intervene to
enforce federal law against the need to avoid unduly interfering with the
elected branches. Consequently, it is unsurprising that federal justiciability
40

Id. at 571–78.
Id. at 576 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
42
Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1368–71. This model is also known as the “law declaration” model.
FALLON ET AL., supra note 36, at 73.
43
Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1368–71.
44
Id.
45
See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 284 (1990) (explaining that the
special functions model expands the scope of “the parties and issues” subject to adjudication).
46
Monaghan, supra note 12, at 1397.
47
Id. at 1368.
48
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998).
49
See id.
50
See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275,
327 (2008).
41
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doctrines have developed almost exclusively in the context of determining
whether to adjudicate disputes “arising under” federal law or the
Constitution.51
B. Variance Between State and Federal Justiciability
Article III’s limitations apply only to the federal courts; they do not
extend to state courts.52 States have developed their own justiciability rules
defining the authority of their judiciaries. These doctrines vary from state
to state.53 Some states have adopted doctrines that roughly resemble the
federal justiciability doctrines. Other states allow greater access to their
courts than is available under the federal doctrines. Those latter states have
more readily embraced a special functions model of adjudication,
establishing a broader role for the courts in their governmental system. This
section discusses differences between state justiciability doctrines and
federal justiciability doctrines.
1. Standing.—Standing defines who may bring suit in federal court,
and is “perhaps the most important” of the federal justiciability doctrines.54
The basic requirements for Article III standing are that a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he has suffered a “particularized” “injury in fact” to a
“judicially cognizable interest,” that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the
actions of the defendant, and that the injury will “likely . . . be redressed by
a favorable decision.”55 This test rests on a private-rights conception of the
federal courts. It limits access to the federal courts to only those litigants

51

See Pushaw, supra note 10 (explaining that the cases developing justiciability doctrines are
“invariably . . . federal question case[s]”). These doctrines have not developed in the course of resolving
cases based solely on diversity jurisdiction under Article III because the Supreme Court does not
exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to clarify issues of state law. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (noting that the Supreme Court does not review
“question[s] of state law”).
52
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article III do not
apply to state courts . . . .”).
53
The source of these doctrines also varies from state to state. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts
and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–46 (2001)
(noting that state doctrines derive from state constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions).
54
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
55
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992)). Courts also require the injury to be “actual or imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
As the Court has acknowledged, the imminence requirement mirrors the hardship inquiry for ripeness.
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 & n.8 (2007). For simplicity, this Article
discusses the requirement in terms of ripeness.
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that seek a remedy for personal injuries.56 An individual cannot go to
federal court simply to ensure compliance with the law.57
Further, the Supreme Court has limited the types of injuries that
qualify for standing. For instance, aside from a limited class of suits based
on the Establishment Clause,58 a taxpayer cannot base standing on federal
or state governmental misuse of tax money.59 Similarly, a generalized
interest an individual shares with other members of the public is not
sufficient to establish Article III standing.60 According to the Court, to
allow these common injuries to suffice for standing would unduly expand
the power of the judiciary at the expense of the elected branches of
government.61 Instead, to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that he has suffered a distinct harm beyond the violation of his
interest in seeing the law obeyed. Moreover, the Court has held that
Congress cannot avoid this Article III limitation on standing by enacting
citizen-suit statutes authorizing private individuals to enforce the law.62
Standing doctrine varies widely among the states. Some states, like
Rhode Island, Wyoming, Indiana, and Arizona, have adopted an injury in
fact test similar to the federal one.63 Others, such as California, Louisiana,
and New Hampshire, have rejected that test, concluding that standing

56

Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–72 (2000)
(“[T]he Art. III judicial power exists only to redress . . . injury to the complaining party.” (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975))).
57
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77.
58
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
59
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1445 (2011).
60
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (prohibiting standing based on “generalized interest” (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 160 (1990))).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 576–77 (rejecting the argument that “the public interest in proper administration of the
laws . . . can be converted into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such”). In earlier
cases, the Court said that standing may exist “solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Lujan distinguished these cases by saying that Congress cannot confer standing on a
person who has not suffered a “de facto” injury; instead, Congress may simply identify which factual
injuries may form the basis of standing. 504 U.S. at 577–78.
63
E.g., Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 327 (Alaska 1987) (basing standing on “interestinjury,” such as “economic” harm); Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz.
2005) (en banc) (stating that a plaintiff must allege “palpable injury” for standing (quoting Sears v.
Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1998))); State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d
978, 979 (Ind. 2003) (stating standing turns on a showing of “injury”); Ritchhart v. Daub, 594 N.W.2d
288, 291–92 (Neb. 1999) (requiring a “personal stake” to show standing); Haviland v. Simmons, 45
A.3d 1246, 1256 (R.I. 2012) (stating that only a “plaintiff who has suffered injury in fact” has standing
(quoting Meyer v. City of Newport, 844 A.2d 148, 151 (R.I. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)));
To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 27 P.3d 1149, 1154–55 (Wash. 2001) (requiring “sufficient factual
injury” for standing (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 82 (Wash. 1978))); Miller v.
Wyo. Dep’t of Health, 275 P.3d 1257, 1261 (Wyo. 2012) (expressly following federal standard).
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depends on whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of a legal right.64
Others have concluded that injury in fact is the default requirement for
standing but that the legislature may extend standing by statute to plaintiffs
who have not experienced a factual injury.65 And some have adopted still
other tests. In Utah, for example, plaintiffs may have standing when there is
no other person better situated to bring suit.66 Moreover, various states have
said that standing is a prudential doctrine subject to legislative
modification.67 And some have concluded that standing is not jurisdictional
at all,68 and consequently may be waived and, presumably, modified by the
legislature.69
States have also not placed the same restrictions on generalized
grievances as the Supreme Court. For example, according to a recent
survey, at least thirty-six states allow taxpayer standing.70 Furthermore,
many states, including six that otherwise require injury in fact (Arizona,

64

See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (looking solely to
rights conferred by statute to determine standing); La. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. State, 669
So. 2d 1185, 1192 (La. 1996) (determining standing by looking only to alleged violation of rights);
Libertarian Party of N.H. v. Sec’y of State, 965 A.2d 1078, 1080 (N.H. 2008) (“In evaluating whether a
party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the party suffered a legal injury against which the law
was designed to protect.” (quoting Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety, 766 A.2d 678 (N.H.
2000))).
65
See, e.g., Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Mich. 2010)
(stating that “a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action” or “if the litigant has a
special injury”); In re Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Minn. 2011) (“Standing to appeal may
be conferred by a statute or by the appellant’s status as an aggrieved party.”); Harrison County. v. City
of Gulfport, 557 So. 2d 780, 782 (Miss. 1990) (granting standing based on “adverse effect” or as
“otherwise authorized by law”); Youngblood v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (S.C.
2013) (requiring injury in fact only “[w]hen no statute confers standing”); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 556 (Tex. 2000) (requiring injury “absent a statutory exception” (quoting Hunt v.
Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984))); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (basing
standing on “statutory right” or “direct injury”).
66
See, e.g., Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013).
67
See, e.g., Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (“Standing [is] a
matter of self-restraint . . . .”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 312 (Haw. 2007)
(describing “standing doctrine” as “prudential rules of judicial self-governance”); Lansing Sch. Educ.
Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 699 (calling standing “prudential”); Kellas v. Dep’t of Corr., 145 P.3d 139, 143
(Or. 2006) (describing standing as “prudent” (citation omitted)); In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243
(Pa. 2003) (calling “standing” a “prudential, judicially-created tool”).
68
See, e.g., Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Miller Cnty. Cir. Ct., 361 S.W.3d 809, 816 (Ark. 2010)
(“[S]tanding is not a component of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .”); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp.,
930 N.E.2d 895, 916 (Ill. 2010) (“[L]ack of standing is an affirmative defense . . . .”); Harrison v.
Leach, 323 S.W.3d 702, 707–08 (Ky. 2010) (“[A] trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is distinct
from standing . . . .”).
69
See, e.g., Lebron, 930 N.E.2d at 916 (stating that a lack of standing defense can be forfeited).
70
Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State Constitutional
Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1277
(2012).

67

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Indiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming), waive
standing requirements in cases raising an important public interest.71
2. Ripeness.—Unlike standing, which limits who can bring suit,
ripeness defines when a person may bring suit.72 Ripeness prohibits courts
from hearing suits prematurely.73 It limits jurisdiction only when a plaintiff
seeks prospective relief like an injunction to prevent future harms.74
Ripeness in federal courts depends on two considerations: (1) whether the
parties will suffer hardship without prompt judicial consideration and (2)
whether the issues are fit for immediate judicial review or would benefit
from future developments.75 According to the Supreme Court, ripeness
involves “constitutional” and “prudential” considerations,76 but the Court
has not clarified whether constitutional considerations underlie only one or
both prongs of the ripeness inquiry.77
Many states follow the federal standard.78 But some do not. A few
states, such as Arkansas, have focused only on the fitness prong,79 whereas

71

Youngblood, 741 S.E.2d at 518 (recognizing “public importance exception”); Gregory, 299 P.3d
at 1104 (waiving standing in suit claiming violation of the Utah constitution’s single-subject rule on the
ground that the suit was of “significant public importance” (quoting Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v.
Tooele County. ex rel. Tooele Cnty. Comm’n, 214 P.3d 95, 98 (Utah 2009))); Vill. Rd. Coal. v. Teton
Cnty. Hous. Auth., 298 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2013) (relaxing standing in cases of “great public interest”
(quoting Maxfield v. State, 294 P.3d 895, 900 (Wyo. 2013))); see Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc.,
108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (same); State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790
N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind. 2003) (same); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) (same); Bd. of
Trs. of State Insts. of Higher Learning v. Ray, 809 So. 2d 627, 632 (Miss. 2002) (same); New Energy
Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 290 (N.M. 2011) (same); see also Sierra Club, 167 P.3d at 312
(relaxing standing when “the needs of justice so require”); Nebraskans Against Expanded Gambling,
Inc. v. Neb. Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Ass’n, 605 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Neb. 2000) (noting
“great public concern” exception); Salorio v. Glaser, 414 A.2d 943, 947 (N.J. 1980); State ex rel.
Howard v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45, 52 (Okla. 1980); Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116
(R.I. 1992) (recognizing “substantial public interest” exception); To-Ro Trade Shows v. Collins, 27
P.3d 1149, 1155 (Wash. 2001) (waiving standing when “the interest of the public . . . is overwhelming”
(quoting In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 660 (Wash. 1987) (en banc), amended by 744 P.2d 340 (Wash.
1987))).
72
Nichol, supra note 12, at 160–62.
73
See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967).
74
F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 63–64 (2012).
75
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.
76
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010).
77
As a logical matter, only the hardship inquiry should be based on Article III. Whether a case is fit
for review does not implicate the power of the courts to act; instead, it focuses on whether the court has
adequate information to make an informed decision. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
§ 2.4.1, at 119 (6th ed. 2012) (“[T]he focus on the quality of the record seems prudential.”).
78
See, e.g., La. Fed’n of Teachers v. State, 94 So. 3d 760, 763 (La. 2012) (asking whether “issues
are fit” for review and whether “the parties will suffer hardship” if the court does not grant the
requested relief); accord Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Haw., 219 P.3d
1111, 1123 (Haw. 2009); Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 901 N.E.2d 373, 384 (Ill. 2008); State ex rel.
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others, like Oregon and Florida, have focused only on the hardship prong.80
Some states have explicitly rejected the federal standard. Alaska, for
example, has stated that its ripeness doctrines are “more lenient than their
federal counterpart.”81 Other states have said that their ripeness doctrine
differs from the federal one but have looked to federal decisions for
guidance.82 And some states have not yet developed a robust ripeness
doctrine.83
States also differ on whether ripeness is mandatory or discretionary.
Most states have concluded that ripeness is prudential,84 but at least six
have deemed it mandatory.85 And some states have concluded that parts of
ripeness are mandatory and others are discretionary. For example,
Kentucky has deemed the hardship prong mandatory but the fitness prong
discretionary,86 while Nebraska has deemed the fitness prong mandatory
but the hardship prong prudential.87
Morrison v. Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 377–83 (Kan. 2008); Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d
707, 713 (R.I. 2000).
79
Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Ark. 1996) (basing ripeness on whether “additional
facts are necessary for decision”).
80
State v. Newman, 405 So. 2d 971, 972 (Fla. 1981) (discussing only the plaintiff’s stake to
determine ripeness); Yancy v. Shatzer, 97 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Or. 2004) (stating that ripeness involves the
“practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties” (quoting Brumnett v. Psychiatric Sec.
Review Bd., 848 P.2d 1194, 1196 (Or. 1993))).
81
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937, 942 (Alaska 2004).
82
See, e.g., State v. Fischer, 876 A.2d 232, 237 (N.H. 2005) (stating that the state has “not adopted
a formal test for ripeness,” but finding federal test “persuasive”); Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 249
(Tex. 2001) (stating that “ripeness . . . should be determined by state law” but following federal test);
State v. M.W., 57 A.3d 696, 699 (Vt. 2012) (declaring federal ripeness law “instructive” but not
binding); see also Ex parte Riley, 11 So. 3d 801, 806–07 (Ala. 2008) (following the same “basic
rationale” as federal ripeness doctrine).
83
Winkle v. City of Tucson, 949 P.2d 502, 504 (Ariz. 1997) (stating that a court cannot render
judgment “on a situation that may never occur” (citing Ariz. Downs v. Turf Paradise, Inc., 682 P.2d
443, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984))); Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d
331, 336 (Ind. 1994) (ripeness depends on whether the dispute turns on “actual facts rather than on
abstract possibilities”); Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 739–40 (Ky. 2007) (stating that questions
that “are purely advisory or hypothetical” are not ripe (quoting Doe v. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173
S.W.3d 260, 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005))); Granville Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. N.C. Hazardous Waste
Mgmt. Comm’n, 407 S.E.2d 785, 791 (N.C. 1991) (stating ripeness prevents “premature intervention”
(quoting Elmore v. Lanier, 155 S.E.2d 114, 116 (N.C. 1967))).
84
See Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The Florida Private
Property Rights Protection Act, 47 FLA. L. REV. 411, 419 n.40 (1995) (“[S]tate courts apply
ripeness . . . under prudential concerns.”).
85
See Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524, 530 (Colo. 2008); Davidson v. Wright, 151
P.3d 812, 817 (Idaho 2006); State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 179 P.3d 366, 382 (Kan. 2008); Am.
Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 627 So. 2d 158, 162 (La. 1993); MEAMFT v. McCulloch, 291 P.3d 1075, 1078 (Mont. 2012); State v. Hammer, 787 N.W.2d 716, 725 (N.D.
2010).
86
W.B. v. Commonwealth, 388 S.W.3d 108, 114–17 (Ky. 2012).
87
Omaha v. Elkhorn, 752 N.W.2d 137, 145 (Neb. 2008).
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In addition, ripeness does not function the same way in state and
federal court. For example, states with liberal standing rules allow litigants
to avoid ripeness obstacles.88 Ripeness limits jurisdiction only when a
plaintiff alleges a possible future injury; it does not apply when a plaintiff
seeks relief for a present harm. States with broad standing doctrines have
expanded the scope of what constitutes a present injury. For instance, a
concerned citizen invoking a citizen suit provision may base standing on
either the present harm of the defendant’s illegal conduct or the possible
future injury that the plaintiff may suffer from the defendant’s illegal
conduct. The latter type of injury raises ripeness concerns because the
injury may not transpire. But the former type of injury is a presently
occurring injury that raises no ripeness issues. Thus, ripeness poses less of
an obstacle in states that recognize standing under citizen suit provisions.
The Michigan Supreme Court’s opinion in Lansing Schools Education
Association v. Lansing Board of Education provides an example.89 There,
schoolteachers sought an injunction ordering the school board to expel
students who assaulted teachers.90 Under federal law, the only interest that
would have sufficed for the teachers’ standing was the threat that they
might face assaults, but that claim of injury would not have been justiciable
under federal ripeness doctrine because the teachers did not claim that they
faced an imminent threat of assault.91 The Michigan Supreme Court,
however, concluded that the claim was justiciable because the teachers had
standing based on their present interest in seeing the appropriate
enforcement of the law92—an interest that does not support standing under
federal doctrine.93
3. Mootness.—Mootness is the counterpart to ripeness. It bars a
federal court from hearing a claim if the plaintiff loses his interest in the
case after it has been filed.94 In that circumstance, the Supreme Court has
explained, the court hearing the suit no longer has a case or controversy
before it.95
88

See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 102 P.3d 937, 942 (Alaska 2004) (noting that
liberal standing rules expand ripeness because “[r]ipeness is an aspect of standing”).
89
792 N.W.2d 686, 699 (Mich. 2010).
90
Id. at 689.
91
Although the teachers claimed to have been assaulted in the past, past injuries do not support
standing to seek prospective relief under federal doctrine. See id.; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210–11 (1995) (“[P]ast injury . . . does nothing to establish a real and immediate
threat . . . [of] similar injury in the future.” (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
92
Lansing Schs., 792 N.W.2d at 701; see also Cusack v. Howlett, 254 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ill. 1969)
(rejecting a ripeness challenge on the ground that plaintiff had present taxpayer standing).
93
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–77 (1992).
94
See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).
95
Id.
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Unlike with the other Article III justiciability doctrines, federal courts
have largely applied a special functions model to mootness, recognizing a
number of exceptions to mootness that allow courts to resolve cases even in
the absence of a continuing dispute. For example, federal courts may hear
an otherwise moot case when the issue presented is “capable of repetition,
yet evading review”;96 when the defendant ceased its conduct voluntarily;97
when the lead plaintiff in an uncertified class action has had his claim
resolved;98 or when the challenged action has collateral consequences for
the plaintiff.99
States also prohibit the resolution of moot cases.100 Although many
have recognized exceptions similar to those for federal mootness,101 the
overlap is not complete. Oregon, for example, does not recognize the
capable of repetition yet evading review exception,102 and many states have
not had the opportunity to determine whether to recognize the class action
exception.103 Moreover, even in those states that do recognize the federal
exceptions, the scope of those exceptions differs from state to state.104
Furthermore, states have created other exceptions that the federal courts do
not recognize. The most common is an exception for cases presenting
96

Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1992) (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816
(1969)). That exception allows a court to hear a claim that is otherwise moot if there is a reasonable
probability that the defendant will again engage in the complained-of conduct. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17
(citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 474, 481 (1990)).
97
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).
98
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980).
99
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53 (1968).
100
See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
562, 567 n.14 (2009) (noting that states have adopted mootness restrictions).
101
For states that apply the capable of repetition yet evading review exception, see State v. Rochon,
75 So. 3d 876, 886 n.12 (La. 2011) (gathering state cases). For states applying the voluntary cessation
exception, see, for example, Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65, 72 (Ala.
2009); Wolf v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 327 N.E.2d 885, 889–90 (Mass. 1975); Oklahoma
Firefighters Pension & Retirement System v. City of Spencer, 237 P.3d 125, 129 (Okla. 2009); Allen v.
Colautti, 417 A.2d 1303, 1306 (Pa. 1980); and All Cycle, Inc. v. Chittenden Solid Waste District, 670
A.2d 800, 803 (Vt. 1995). For states applying the class action exception, see Kagan v. Gibraltar
Savings & Loan Ass’n, 676 P.2d 1060, 1065 (Cal. 1984); Wolf, 327 N.E.2d at 890; and Heckman v.
Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 163 (Tex. 2012). For states applying the collateral consequences
doctrine, see Zachary C. Howenstine, Conforming Doctrine to Practice: Making Room for Collateral
Consequences in the Missouri Mootness Analysis, 73 MO. L. REV. 859, 869 nn.67–69 (2008) (gathering
cases).
102
Yancy v. Shatzer, 97 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Or. 2004) (“The judicial power under the Oregon
Constitution does not extend to moot cases that are ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’”).
103
Searches on Westlaw reveal fewer than thirty state cases even discussing such an exception.
WESTLAWNEXT, http://next.westlaw.com [http://perma.cc/N5DS-QX49] (search “moot! /20 class /3
action /10 except!”).
104
See, e.g., Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 819 (R.I. 2007) (limiting capable of repetition yet
evading review exception to cases involving public importance); Howenstine, supra note 101, at 870–
72 (noting a more narrow collateral order exception in Connecticut and Missouri).
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questions of public importance.105 Others include the power to hear a moot
case if the issue occurs frequently106 and an exception if the issue becomes
moot only after argument.107 Finally, many states have deemed mootness
prudential,108 and consequently modifiable by the legislature and waivable.
4. Nonadversarial Suits.—Federal courts cannot hear suits in which
the parties are not adverse. For example, in Moore v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that there was
“no case or controversy” when both the plaintiff and the defendant sought
the same outcome in the case.109
Most state courts that have addressed the issue also forbid
nonadversarial suits110 although a few courts maintain that their jurisdiction
includes nonadversarial suits. For example, courts in Louisiana have held

105

See, e.g., Underwood v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 39 So. 3d 120, 130 (Ala. 2009) (“There is a
well established exception to the mootness doctrine allowing courts to reach the ultimate issue even if it
has become moot where a broad public interest is involved.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 193 P.3d 839, 843 (Haw. 2008) (recognizing “the public interest
exception”); Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 275 P.3d 438, 448 (Wyo. 2012) (“If a case
presents an issue of great public importance or interest, we may rule on the issue even if the dispute is
technically moot.”); accord Gray v. Mitchell, 285 S.W.3d 222, 233 (Ark. 2008); State v. Rogers, 91
P.3d 1127, 1130–31 (Idaho 2004); In re Commitment of Schulpius, 707 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Wis. 2006).
106
Schulpius, 707 N.W.2d at 500.
107
In re Dunn, 181 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
108
Hall, supra note 100, at 567 n.14 (“State courts . . . generally treat their mootness doctrines as
prudential . . . .”). For states treating mootness as a mandatory doctrine, see Chapman v. Gooden, 974
So. 2d 972, 983–84 (Ala. 2007); State v. T.D., 944 A.2d 288, 294 (Conn. 2008); National Education
Ass’n-Topeka, Inc. v. U.S.D. 501, 608 P.2d 920, 923 (Kan. 1980); Kentucky High School Athletics Ass’n
v. Runyon, 920 S.W.2d 525, 526 (Ky. 1996); St. Charles Parish School Board v. GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d
1165, 1166 (La. 1987); In re B.S. v. State, 966 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Progressive
Direct Insurance Co. v. Stuivenga, 276 P.3d 867, 872 (Mont. 2012); Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d
876, 877 (N.Y. 1980); National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tex. 1999); and
State v. Rooney, 965 A.2d 481, 484 (Vt. 2008).
109
402 U.S. 47 (1971) (per curiam); see also, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 360–61
(1911) (dismissing as nonjusticiable a suit in which the United States had “no interest adverse to the
claimants”). Although usually framed in terms of Article III, at least some modern authority describes
the limitation as prudential. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 171
n.3 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the “policy against friendly or collusive suits” and
distinguishing that policy from “justiciability” doctrines).
110
See City of Birmingham v. Bouldin, 190 So. 2d 271, 274 (Ala. 1966); City & Cnty. of S.F. v.
Boyd, 140 P.2d 666, 670 (Cal. 1943); Commonwealth United Corp. v. Rothberg, 143 S.E.2d 741, 742
(Ga. 1965); Cnty. of Kaua’i v. Baptiste, 165 P.3d 916, 931 (Haw. 2007); Schneider v. Howe, 133 P.3d
1232, 1237 (Idaho 2006); Neu v. Neu, 298 N.W. 318, 320 (Mich. 1941); Clinton Co-op. Farmers
Elevator Ass’n v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n, 26 N.W.2d 117, 121 (Minn. 1947); Meeker v.
Straat, 38 Mo. App. 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1889); Haley v. Eureka Cnty. Bank, 26 P. 64, 66–67 (Nev.
1891).
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that they may hear nonadversarial suits,111 and Maryland courts have held
that they may hear such suits so long as they present important issues.112
5. Political Questions.—Unlike the other doctrines of justiciability,
which ask only whether a dispute has taken the appropriate form for
judicial resolution, the political question doctrine limits the power of the
courts to decide issues in particular subject areas. Although ill-defined,113
the doctrine applies to essentially two situations.114 First, it prohibits courts
from resolving disputes that the Constitution commits to another branch of
the federal government.115 This limitation does not derive from Article III.
Instead, it flows from other provisions of the Constitution that assign
particular subjects to other branches,116 and it applies equally to federal and
state courts. No court—state or federal—can decide an issue that the
Constitution commits to another institution.117
Second, a dispute presents a political question when there is “a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”118
Although a doctrine of justiciability, this limitation depends on the content
of substantive law: a dispute presents a political question if a court cannot
identify a manageable standard to implement substantive law.119 Almost all
111

Blaize v. Hayes, 15 So. 2d 217, 224 (La. 1943) (“[A] lawsuit is not objectionable to the courts
merely because the parties to the suit believe that it should and desire that it shall be decided in a given
way.”).
112
Columbia Park & Recreation Ass’n, Inc. v. Olander, 410 A.2d 592, 596 (Md. 1980) (stating that
suits that involve “the validity of a statute or . . . regulation . . . , or an urgently needed determination
affecting future governmental conduct, and in which the public’s concern is both imperative and
manifest, need not hereafter necessarily be dismissed as collusive.” (quoting Reyes v. Prince George’s
Cnty., 380 A.2d 12, 24 (Md. 1977))).
113
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1031
(1985) (noting disagreement over scope and importance of doctrine).
114
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), lists six considerations for finding a political question:
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
[(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
But the Court has indicated that only the first two considerations are important. See Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (stating that the other tests are of less importance).
115
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
116
See Pushaw, supra note 24, at 1294 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
117
See Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310, 317 (Wash. 2009) (recognizing that state courts cannot
resolve issues “conferred upon Congress”).
118
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228.
119
See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (dismissing political gerrymandering claim as nonjusticiable because
of lack of judicially manageable standard); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1285–96 (2006) (identifying criteria to assess
manageability of substantive law).
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states that have addressed the issue have adopted this standard.120 The one
exception is Wyoming, which has stated that it is not bound by the
judicially manageable standard, though it has not provided a different
standard for determining political questions.121
6. Advisory Opinions.—Federal courts cannot issue advisory
opinions. Although courts have used the term “advisory opinion”
broadly—essentially as a catchall to refer to cases that are not justiciable
because of defects in standing, ripeness, mootness, or adversity—the
doctrine in its pure form prohibits a federal court from providing advice on
legal questions posed by Congress or the President.122 A corollary of that
prohibition is that courts cannot issue a decision that is subject to review by
another branch of government;123 such a decision merely provides advice to
the reviewing entity, which may decide the matter differently from the
courts.
States agree that requests for advisory opinions are not justiciable.124
Although eleven states authorize their supreme courts to issue advisory
opinions to their legislatures or governors,125 all but one have stated that
advisory opinions are not the product of the exercise of the judicial
power.126 In these states, when courts render advisory opinions, they are not
120

See, e.g., State v. Tongass Conservation Soc’y, 931 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska 1997); Kromko v.
Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 171 (Ariz. 2007) (en banc); Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 378
(Colo. 2009) (en banc); Nielsen v. State, 670 A.2d 1288, 1291–92 (Conn. 1996); Trs. of Office of
Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d 446, 458 (Haw. 1987); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672
N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164,
178–79 (Neb. 2007); In re Veto by Governor Chris Christie, 58 A.3d 735, 744 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2012); Bay Ridge Cmty. Council v. Carey, 454 N.Y.S.2d 186, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Thornburgh v.
Lewis, 470 A.2d 952, 955 (Pa. 1983); Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm., 214 S.W.3d 419,
435 (Tenn. 2007).
121
State v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 334–35 (Wyo. 2001).
122
Lee, supra note 12, at 643–47.
123
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792).
124
Jonathan D. Persky, Comment, “Ghosts That Slay”: A Contemporary Look at State Advisory
Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155, 1180–81 (2005) (cataloging states).
125
Eight states do so by constitution, see COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 3(b)(10); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. III, art. II; MICH. CONST. art. III, § 8; N.H.
CONST. pt. II, art. LXXIV; R.I. CONST. art. X, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 5, and three by statute, see
ALA. CODE § 12-2-10 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 (2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1003
(West 2003). The scope of the power varies from state to state. Rhode Island, for example, permits
advisory opinions on “any question of law” at the request of the governor or legislature. R.I. CONST. art.
X, § 3. By contrast, Alabama limits the power to addressing only “important constitutional questions,”
ALA. CODE § 12-2-10, and Oklahoma permits advisory opinions only on whether a death sentence was
properly imposed, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1003.
126
See Mel A. Topf, State Supreme Court Advisory Opinions as Illegitimate Judicial Review,
2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 101, 107 n.28 (collecting authority from each state that issues
advisory opinions, except Colorado, stating that those opinions are not the product of the judicial
power).
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adjudicating; rather, they are exercising a separate power, much as they do
when they promulgate rules of civil procedure.127 The one possible
exception is Colorado. Its supreme court has said that its advisory opinions
have the “force and effect of judicial precedents.”128 Still, that those
opinions are binding does not mean that they must be the product of the
judicial power (after all, rules of civil procedure are binding yet not the
product of the judicial power), and the Colorado court has not addressed
the issue.
C. Justiciability in Diversity
Although federal courts developed justiciability doctrines primarily in
the context of determining whether to adjudicate disputes presenting
federal questions, they have applied those federal justiciability
requirements equally to all nine categories of cases and controversies,
including suits brought under the diversity jurisdiction provisions.129
Under these diversity provisions, the jurisdiction of the court depends
on the identity of the parties rather than the substance of the claim. As long
as the parties are diverse, federal courts may hear and resolve cases
involving only questions of state law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stressed that when a federal court sits in diversity to hear state law claims,
it operates simply as “another court of the State” in which it sits130 and
accordingly must apply the state’s substantive law.131
Although federal courts must apply state substantive law in suits
brought under diversity jurisdiction, they do not follow state justiciability
doctrine. Instead, federal courts have applied federal justiciability rules.132
127

See id.
In re Senate Resolution Relating to Senate Bill No. 65, 21 P. 478, 479 (Colo. 1889).
129
See Pushaw, supra note 51, at 450–60. Those provisions extend the federal judicial power to
suits between a state and citizens of another state; citizens of different states; and a state, or its citizens,
and a foreign country or its citizens. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Article III also extends jurisdiction to
suits “between two or more States.” Id. Although that provision sounds in diversity, those suits may
raise unique concerns because they involve disputes between two sovereigns, as evidenced by the
exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over those suits and the application of only federal law to
resolve those disputes. See generally 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4045, at 151 (3d ed. 1998) (describing the procedures to account for the unique interests
in suits between states). It therefore is not included within the argument in this Article.
130
Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945).
131
King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948).
132
For cases applying the federal mootness doctrine, see McNair v. Synapse Group Inc., 672 F.3d
213, 227 (3d Cir. 2012); Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002); National
Iranian Oil Co. v. Mapco International, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 489–90 (3d Cir. 1992); and Fairview Park
Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo Construction Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1126–27 (3d Cir. 1977). For cases
applying the federal ripeness doctrine, see Kennedy v. Ferguson, 679 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012);
Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 623 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2010); and Camasta
v. Omaha Steaks International, Inc., No. 12-cv-08285, 2013 WL 4495661, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21,
128
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The one exception is standing: many federal courts have concluded that a
dispute must satisfy both the federal and state standing requirements.133 But
even then, when a plaintiff has standing under state law but not under
federal law, federal courts cannot hear the suit.
Levy v. Dial Corp. provides an illustration.134 There, Carol Levy, a
resident of California, sued the Dial Corporation in California state court
for violating California’s Fair Packaging and Label Act. Although Dial’s
misconduct had not harmed Levy, Levy brought suit as a private attorney
general, as authorized by California law.135 Dial, which was incorporated in
Delaware and has its principal place of business in Arizona, removed the
case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.136 The federal court
concluded that removal was improper because Levy did not have standing
under federal law.137 Although acknowledging that Levy had standing to
proceed in California’s courts, the court explained that Levy did not have
standing to proceed in federal court because she had not suffered a “distinct
and palpable injury to [her]self.”138 The court accordingly remanded,
forcing Dial to litigate in California state court and to face potential (or at
least potentially perceived) state court bias.139
Levy is but one example of this phenomenon. There are many other
reported examples of federal courts refusing to hear suits brought under
diversity jurisdiction based on federal justiciability doctrines even though
those suits would be permitted in state court.140 Moreover, these reported
2013). For cases applying the federal doctrine against collusive suits, see In re Asbestos Litigation, 90
F.3d 963, 988 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, Flanagan v. Ahearn, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997).
Finally, for cases applying the federal advisory opinion doctrine, see McCurry ex rel. Turner v.
Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 597 (6th Cir. 2002).
133
See, e.g., Morell v. Star Taxi, 343 F.App’x 54, 57 (6th Cir. 2009) (“When jurisdiction is
premised on diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III and state law
in order to maintain a cause of action.”); Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host
Corp. 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Where . . . jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of
citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III of the Constitution and applicable state
law . . . .”); Metro. Express Servs., Inc. v. Kansas City, 23 F.3d 1367, 1369 (8th Cir. 1994) (requiring
standing under state law and Article III for diversity cases); see also 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
129, § 3531.14, at 296–98 (“Federal courts have stated that state law of standing should be applied as to
state rights in . . . diversity jurisdiction . . . . Of course state rules that recognize standing need not be
honored if Article III requirements are not met.”).
134
No. C-97-0537 MHP, 1997 WL 588925 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1997).
135
See id. at *1 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2008)); see also Korea Supply Co.
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2003) (“Standing to sue” under section 17204
extends to “any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public”).
136
Levy, 1997 WL 588925, at *1.
137
Id. at *4.
138
Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
139
Id. at *5.
140
See, e.g., Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 935–36 (8th Cir. 2012)
(dismissing suit brought in diversity because plaintiff failed to demonstrate federal standing, but
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decisions almost certainly do not capture the full impact of applying federal
justiciability doctrines in diversity cases.141 There are doubtless many
unreported federal decisions concluding that a dispute that could be
brought in state court is not justiciable under Article III.142 Following
federal justiciability rules in diversity cases also likely results in fewer
cases being pursued in federal court by litigants who worry that they fail
the federal justiciability requirements.143
II. FOLLOWING STATE JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINES IN DIVERSITY
Federal courts should not apply federal justiciability requirements to
state law cases brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Instead,
federal courts should follow the state justiciability requirements of the state
in which the federal court sits.144 Doing so is consistent with the text of
recognizing standing in state court); Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1000–02 (9th Cir. 2001)
(dismissing claim brought under diversity because plaintiff failed to demonstrate federal standing, but
recognizing standing in state court); Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 495 (6th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing Ohio taxpayer standing against out-of-stater for lack of standing, but recognizing standing
in Ohio court); Jenkins v. Apple, Inc., No. 11-CV-01828-LHK, 2011 WL 2619094, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
July 1, 2011) (remanding to state court on the ground that plaintiffs lacked federal standing); see also
Kennedy v. Ferguson, 679 F.3d 998, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012) (dismissing as unripe under federal doctrines,
without evaluating case under state ripeness doctrine); McNair v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 227
(3d Cir. 2012) (dismissing as moot under federal doctrines, without evaluating case under state
mootness doctrine); Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 623 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir.
2010) (dismissing as unripe under federal doctrines, without evaluating case under state ripeness
doctrine); Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010) (refusing to certify class
because some members of putative class lacked federal standing, but recognizing standing in state
court); Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (dismissing as moot under federal
doctrines, without evaluating case under state mootness doctrine).
141
One might think that abandoning federal standing would have little consequence because of the
$75,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). If a plaintiff lacks a sufficient
stake to satisfy federal standing, he also must not satisfy the amount in controversy. Not so. Standing
problems usually arise when plaintiffs seek an injunction that is costly for the defendant, and many
courts have held that the defendant’s cost is an appropriate measure for the amount in controversy. See
14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 3703. In any event, the amount-in-controversy requirement does
not affect other justiciability doctrines.
142
See Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court: An
Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 247 (2007) (“[O]nly a small fraction of district judges’
rulings . . . are available electronically.”). Although circuit decisions are more widely available, circuit
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from remands for lack of jurisdiction. § 1447(d).
Removed cases likely constitute a substantial portion of cases in which the federal courts determine that
state but not federal justiciability requirements have been satisfied because removal reflects the
defendant’s effort to avoid state court.
143
See Hessick, supra note 74, at 90 (explaining that rigorous standing rules inevitably reduce the
number of suits raising standing issues because most plaintiffs who lack standing will not spend
resources to bring suit that will be dismissed).
144
Applying the law of the state in which the federal courts sits is not the only possible test. What
is important is that the federal court acts as an alternative state court. One might be able to devise a
different test—a test that depends on something other than the location of the federal court—to
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Article III and would better achieve diversity jurisdiction’s goal of
providing an alternative federal forum for the resolution of state law
claims.
A. History and Text of the Diversity Provisions
The history and text of the diversity provisions in Article III support
the notion that federal courts sitting in diversity should be able to hear any
state law case that can be brought in state court.145 To start, the diversity
provisions of Article III do not exclude federal jurisdiction over particular
categories of claims depending on what is at stake or the rights involved.
Nor do they list justiciability requirements. Rather, they extend the federal
judicial power to any controversy in which the parties are diverse.146 So
long as the parties are diverse, the text of Article III allows a federal forum
for any controversy that could proceed in state court.
The term controversy itself also does not provide a basis for following
federal instead of state justiciability requirements. At the time of
ratification, “controversies” were understood to comprise disputes
amenable to judicial resolution.147 But until the nineteenth century, state
and federal courts shared a common view about what constituted a dispute
subject to judicial resolution.148 So long as a dispute was civil, the term

determine which state law applies. This Article proposes following the law of the state in which the
federal court sits because it is consistent with Erie, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941) (following substantive law of the state in which federal court sits), and is easily
administered. Other proposals may produce seemingly strange results. For example, say Congress
redesigned the district court system so that diversity claims could be brought only in district court in
Maryland. In this example, Maryland’s justiciability rules would apply. Although that result may seem
odd, it is no stranger than what already occurs for standing because federal courts already require
satisfaction of state (as well as federal) standing rules in diversity cases. See supra note 133. Nor is the
quirk unique to justiciability rules. Federal courts would likewise apply Maryland’s substantive law to
all claims brought in diversity. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
145
One might argue that Article III should be read to allow only those actions that could be brought
at the time of ratification. But limiting jurisdiction in that way is unwarranted because the scope of
jurisdiction at the Founding was generally flexible. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing after
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 184 (1992) (stating that
standing depended on the availability of a cause of action). Moreover, reading Article III to limit
jurisdiction to what existed at the founding would undermine diversity’s goal of providing an
alternative forum to state courts because of the ability of state law to change.
146
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
147
See 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 430 (James Madison) (explaining that it was “generally
supposed” that “the jurisdiction given” in Article III “was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary
nature”).
148
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 269 (“Until the end of the nineteenth century, both state and federal
courts appear to have had a common understanding of the limits of judicial power in litigated cases.”).
That view was that the “judicial power” was the power “to examine the truth of the fact, to determine
the law arising upon that fact, and, if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain, and . . . apply
the remedy.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25.
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controversy had no bearing on the distribution of power between the
federal and state judicial systems.149 To be sure, there is evidence that
controversies did not include criminal cases,150 but nothing suggests that the
Framers used the term “controversies” to prevent the federal courts from
hearing categories of civil suits that could be brought in state court.151
The Judiciary Act of 1789 also suggests that the term “controversy”
was not meant to impose separate federal justiciability requirements. That
Act conferred jurisdiction over “all suits of a civil nature” with amounts in
controversy exceeding $500 between a citizen of one state and a citizen of
another or an alien.152 The use of the word “suits” instead of
“controversies” suggests that the members of the First Congress, many of
whom participated in the drafting of the Constitution,153 did not understand

149

Fletcher, supra note 13, at 266 (“[T]he words ‘case’ and ‘controversy’ in article III were terms
of art that were not intended to have significance for the relation between the federal and state judicial
systems.”).
150
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES app. note E at 420–21 (St. George Tucker, ed.,
Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (explaining that while the term “case”
referred to all disputes, “whether civil or criminal,” the term “controversy” referred only to disputes “of
a civil nature” and therefore excluded criminal cases). Modern commentators generally agree with this
position. See James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party
Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 607 n.207 (1994) (collecting scholarly articles agreeing that
“controversies,” unlike “cases,” excludes criminal cases). Professors Amar and Pushaw have offered
different theories. Amar has argued that the reason for the different terms “cases” and “controversies”
was to highlight the distinction between disputes over which Congress did have the power to limit
federal jurisdiction (“controversies”) and disputes over which it did not (“cases”). See Akhil Reed
Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651, 1656–57
(1990). Professor Pushaw has argued that “controversy” referred to a dispute requiring resolution by a
neutral judge. Pushaw, supra note 51, at 450. None of these theories suggests that the federal courts
have less power than state courts in adjudicating civil cases in which the parties are diverse.
151
Further supporting this understanding is that, unlike the “arising under” provision, the diversity
provisions do not limit the judicial power to controversies “in law or equity.” They allow any type of
suit—be it in law, equity, domestic relations, probate, or something else—to be heard in federal court.
See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Against this, one might argue that
Article III confers jurisdiction over “all cases” but omits the word “all” from controversies—a
difference that suggests a greater ability to preclude controversies from federal court. That may be so,
but that suggests only that Congress may limit jurisdiction, not that the Constitution does so. See Amar,
supra note 150, at 1657.
152
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. The text of the Act actually conferred
jurisdiction over all suits to which an alien was a party, id., but the Supreme Court interpreted the
provision to apply only when an alien was a party against a state citizen, see Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
153
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986) (“This ‘Decision of 1789’ provides
‘contemporaneous and weighty’ evidence of the Constitution’s meaning since many of the Members of
the First Congress ‘had taken part in framing that instrument.’” (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783, 790 (1983))).
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the term “controversy” to carry a special meaning prohibiting the federal
courts from hearing some suits that could be brought in state court.154
Further support for this conclusion can be found in the federal and
state courts’ shared common understandings about when a dispute was not
amenable to judicial resolution. For example, although three state courts—
Massachusetts,155 Pennsylvania,156 and New Hampshire157—had the power
to issue advisory opinions in response to questions posed by other
government officials near the time of the Founding, none categorized those
advisory opinions as the product of the exercise of the judicial power.158
Instead, they perceived their power to render advisory opinions only as a
power to give advice.159 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court later
explained, “In giving such opinions, the Justices do not act as a court, but
as the constitutional advisers.”160 Early federal judges shared this
understanding. For instance, in 1793 the Justices refused to answer
President Washington’s questions about France’s rights under various
treaties, explaining that providing answers would require them to act
“extrajudicially.”161
The debates surrounding the adoption of the diversity provisions
further suggest that those provisions were understood to extend federal
jurisdiction over all types of state civil actions when the parties were
diverse.162 For example, John Marshall, a proponent of the diversity
provisions, explained that under the diversity provisions, federal
154

Further supporting this conclusion is that the Act also conferred original jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court over “controversies” between a state and citizens of another state. See § 13, 1 Stat. at
80–81. Nothing in the Act suggests that, by using the term controversy instead of suit, Congress meant
to confer different jurisdiction over diversity disputes depending on whether a state was a party.
155
See MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. III, art. II (1780).
156
The Report of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 3 Binn.
app. at 595 (1808) [hereinafter Report of the Judges].
157
N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74 (1784).
158
Fletcher, supra note 13, at 268–69.
159
Id.
160
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate and House of Representatives, 126 Mass. 557, 566 (1878);
see also Report of the Judges, 3 Binn. app. at 595, n* (describing an advisory opinion as “not
perhaps . . . as authoritative as judicial precedent”).
161
Letter from Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in
3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1782–1793, at 488 (Henry P. Johnston ed.,
New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1891). English courts also shared this view. See 1 JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (1895).
162
Although the diversity provisions received little attention at the Constitutional Convention, they
saw substantial debate in the state ratifying conventions. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 486–87 (1928). However, the debate did not extend to
alienage jurisdiction. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and
Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L.
1, 10 (1996) (“Debate over the merits of alienage jurisdiction was not highly controversial at either the
Constitutional Convention or the various state ratification conventions.”).
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jurisdiction would be “concurrent” over the “causes [that state courts] now
decide.”163 Opponents of the diversity provisions similarly understood the
diversity provisions to confer broad jurisdiction. Illustrative is the argument
of George Mason, who claimed that, by the grant of diversity jurisdiction,
the federal courts would “absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several
States.”164 Mason’s fear rested on the understanding that all state claims
could potentially be encompassed in diversity.165 Other opponents indicated
a similar belief that diversity jurisdiction extended to all suits that could be
brought in state courts when the parties were diverse.166 In response,
supporters did not claim that diversity jurisdiction extended to only some
disputes. Rather, they pointed out that state courts would have exclusive
jurisdiction over state matters when the parties were not diverse167 and
would continue to have concurrent jurisdiction over cases when the parties
were diverse.168
B. Promoting the Purpose for Diversity Jurisdiction
Applying state justiciability doctrines to state law cases brought under
diversity jurisdiction better achieves the goal of diversity jurisdiction.
Unlike with the grants of federal jurisdiction over particular subject areas,
the motivation behind diversity jurisdiction was not to protect federal
interests articulated in the Constitution or federal law.169 Instead, the
163

John Marshall, Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), reprinted in IV THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 247 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
164
See 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 638 (George Mason).
165
Fear that the federal courts would displace the state courts was not the only objection to
diversity jurisdiction. Others included that requiring litigation in federal court would be expensive and
inconvenient and that diversity jurisdiction could result in expansive federal law displacing state law.
See Friendly, supra note 162, at 490–91.
166
PENNSYLVANIA PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in PENNSYLVANIA
AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 469 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone,
eds., Philadelphia, Historical Soc’y of Pa. 1888) (“The judicial powers . . . may be extended to every
case, and thus absorb the State judiciaries . . . .”); see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 542–43 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT] (reporting Patrick Henry’s claim that the grant of diversity jurisdiction
would result in the “destruction of the state judiciaries”).
167
James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution (1788), reprinted in
IV FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 163, at 233 (responding that the state judiciaries will be “left
uncontrolled as to the affairs of the State only”); Letter from James Madison to George Washington
(Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in IV FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION at 228 (stating Mason’s objections left him
“at some loss” because the “great mass of suits in every State lie between Citizen & Citizen, and relate
to matters not of federal cognizance”).
168
Marshall, supra note 163, at 247 (“State courts will not lose jurisdiction of the causes they now
decide. They have a concurrence of jurisdiction with the Federal Courts . . . .”).
169
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“Power to adjudicate between citizens of different states, merely because they are citizens
of different states, has no relation to any substantive rights created by Congress.”).
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primary goal of diversity jurisdiction was to prevent bias, or even the
perception of bias, that state courts might harbor against out-of-state
litigants.170 Diversity jurisdiction empowered federal courts to serve as
neutral fora for the resolution of claims involving those litigants.171 That
neutrality would result in more just decisions; placate, to some degree,
dissatisfied litigants who might otherwise resort to extra-legal measures
were they to lose at the hands of a biased state court;172 and facilitate
business among the several states.173
Consider a suit between State A and a citizen of State B. If a judge
from State A were to hear that claim, the judge might be inclined to rule in
favor of State A because the ruling would benefit the judge’s home state.174
Moreover, judges who rule in favor of their home states might personally
benefit from making such decisions because politicians in the judges’ home
states may reward judges for doing so.175 Indeed, judges might imperil their
careers by ruling against their states, especially in those states that do not
guarantee life tenure or salary for state judges.176 Likewise, if State A
170

See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) (justifying diversity
jurisdiction on the ground that “state attachments . . . might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra
note 2, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing diversity jurisdiction as necessary because the “state
tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased” against out-of-staters); 3 ELLIOT, supra note
166, at 391 (James Madison) (justifying diversity jurisdiction on the ground that “[i]t may happen that a
strong prejudice may arise, in some states, against the citizens of others, who may have claims against
them”).
171
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 537–38 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that, to protect
legal rights in cases in diversity, “[I]t is necessary that [those rights] should be committed to that
tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different states
and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union, will never be likely to feel any
bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded”); accord 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1681, at 557–60 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
172
See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 467–68 (1793) (opinion of Cushing, J.) (stating
that an impartial federal court could prevent appeal to “sword” and “bloodshed”); James William
Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1,
17–18 (1964) (stating that before the adoption of the Constitution, states occasionally resorted to
hostilities to resolve disputes).
173
FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 9–10
(1928).
174
THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) (justifying diversity
jurisdiction in part on the ground that “it would be natural that the judges, as men, should feel a strong
predilection to the claims of their own government”). Although a judge could implement this bias
through interpretations of law adverse to the out-of-state litigant, the precedential effect of that
interpretation could have consequences for in-state litigants in the future. More likely, a judge would
favor his state by making factual findings adverse to the out-of-state litigant.
175
3 STORY, supra note 171, § 1685, at 562–64 (relating that state judges might favor their states
for professional reasons); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting,
127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 118 (2012) (noting that judges continue to be elected in about half the states).
176
Of course, this concern could apply in a case between a state and a citizen of that same state. A
state judge might seek to bolster his career by unjustifiably ruling in favor of the state against the
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brought suit against a citizen of State B in a court of State B, the judge
hearing that case might be inclined to rule against State A for similar
reasons.177
These considerations would have less effect on a federal judge. A
federal judge would likely feel less allegiance to a particular state because
that judge is a federal employee rather than a state employee. Additionally,
federal judges are likely to feel less pressure to rule for the state because of
Article III’s salary and tenure guarantees.178 Providing a federal forum
could also combat against bias held by state jurors against out-of-staters.179
Unlike with criminal juries,180 the Constitution does not require that civil
juries be pulled from the state in which the tort was committed. Moreover,
federal judges could remove biased jurors and instruct the jurors in a way
that avoids bias181—actions unlikely to be taken by a biased state judge.
Similar concerns underlay the grant of jurisdiction over suits between
citizens of a state and foreigners. State judges and juries might favor
parochial interests over foreign ones,182 which could not only lead to unjust
results but also potentially jeopardize foreign relations and trade183 and
possibly lead the nation into war.184 Providing a federal forum would

citizen. But in-state litigants have recourse to the state political process—by petitioning the legislature
to remedy an unfavorable decision or even to punish the judge. By contrast, state judges have little to
fear from out-of-state litigants because those litigants cannot participate in the state political process.
177
Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 475–76 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“[If] a State . . . has demands against some
citizens of another State, it is better that she should prosecute their demands in a national Court, than in
a Court of the State to which those citizens belong; the danger of irritation and criminations arising
from apprehensions and suspicions of partiality, being thereby obviated.”).
178
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
179
See Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 997 (2007).
180
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury; and . . . held in the State
where the said crimes shall have been committed . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy . . . [a] trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . .”).
181
Cf. Jones, supra note 179, at 1021 & n.98.
182
See Johnson, supra note 162, at 14–15 (recounting debates about the bias of state courts against
aliens).
183
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd., 536 U.S. 88, 94–95 (2002)
(“This penchant of the state courts to disrupt international relations and discourage foreign investment
led directly to the alienage jurisdiction provided by Article III of the Constitution.”).
184
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (“As the denial or
perversion of justice by the sentences of courts is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it
will follow, that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of
other countries are concerned.”).
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reduce these risks because it would likely be more neutral and bring a
national perspective to disputes implicating foreign relations.185
Providing a neutral forum for resolving state law claims was also the
reason behind extending federal jurisdiction to controversies between
citizens of different states, though there is disagreement over the precise
type of bias that state courts would harbor. The traditional theory is that
state courts would discriminate, or at least be perceived to discriminate,
against out-of-state litigants in favor of in-state litigants for the same reason
that those judges might discriminate against out-of-staters in suits against
the state itself—a sense of allegiance to the state and an effort to advance
their careers.186 A different theory, most famously articulated by Henry
Friendly, argues that the inclusion of diversity jurisdiction was to protect,
not out-of-state litigants, but creditors.187 According to this view, diversity
jurisdiction was a response to the economic crisis of the late 1780s that led
the legislatures and courts of poorer states to favor in-state debtors over
creditors, who generally were from out of state.188 The belief was that the
federal courts would be more inclined to protect creditors189—a belief that
generally proved to be true in practice.190 In any event, despite the
disagreement over the precise nature of the feared bias, all agree that the
purpose behind federal diversity jurisdiction was to combat bias by
providing an alternative federal forum for claims where the parties were
diverse.
Protecting against potential state court bias in disputes between
diverse parties depends on the ability to extend federal jurisdiction to all
cases that could be brought in state court and in which the parties are
diverse.191 Overlaying Article III justiciability doctrines in diversity cases
185

See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1622–23 (2008) (“These
provisions provided an unbiased forum with a national perspective to resolve disputes that could affect
the United States’ relationship with foreign nations.”).
186
3 STORY, supra note 171, § 1690, at 567 (stating that state judges would be naturally inclined to
favor interests of citizens from their state over citizens from other states); id. § 1685, at 562–64 (stating
that state judges have professional interest in ruling for citizens of their state).
187
Friendly, supra note 162, at 498–99. According to Friendly, there was virtually no evidence of
state bias against out-of-state litigants or that diversity was conferred to combat such bias. See id. at
493. Other commentators, however, have stressed that it was the potential for bias, as opposed to actual
bias, against out-of-staters that led to the grant of diversity. See John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the
Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 24 (1948).
188
Jones, supra note 179, at 1012–13 (claiming that state legislatures set aside verdicts favorable to
creditors, discharged debts, and undertook other actions adverse to creditors).
189
Friendly, supra note 162, at 496–97.
190
Jones, supra note 179, at 1015 (“The empirical evidence suggests that the federal courts were
indeed more conducive to creditor interests than the state courts, and that British creditors frequently
utilized the federal courts during the early decades of the nation’s existence.”).
191
Some cases in which the parties are diverse may also fall within another jurisdictional provision
of Article III. For example, a case in which the parties are diverse may also “aris[e] under” federal law.
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undermines that goal.192 It may prevent federal courts from hearing those
claims because of the difference between federal and state justiciability
doctrines. Diverse parties therefore may be forced into state court to litigate
their claims, despite the threat of bias against the out-of-state party.193
Coyne v. American Tobacco Co. provides an example.194 There, Ohio
taxpayers filed a state law restitution claim in Ohio state court against outof-state tobacco companies, demanding that the companies return to Ohio
money that the state had spent on treating victims of disease caused by
tobacco use. The tobacco companies removed to federal court based on
diversity of citizenship.195 It seems highly likely that the decision to remove
was motivated by fear that an Ohio state court judge would be predisposed
to supporting efforts to help Ohio and its victims of illness from smoking.196
The Sixth Circuit concluded that removal was improper.197 It reasoned that,
although Ohio courts recognize standing in state court based on taxpayer
status, it is not a basis for standing in federal court.198 The tobacco
companies accordingly were compelled to litigate in Ohio state court, just
as Dial was forced to litigate in California state court in the suit brought by
California citizens.199

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The reason for those other bases for jurisdiction was not to prevent possible
discrimination against certain litigants, but to protect federal interests and secure uniformity in federal
law. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton). Still, when another
jurisdictional basis applies, the fear of bias against out-of-staters provides an independent reason for
federal jurisdiction.
192
To be sure, the Framers recognized that in some cases the threat of bias may be so small as not
to warrant the cost of conferring federal jurisdiction by empowering Congress to confer less than the
entirety of diversity jurisdiction authorized by Article III. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449
(1850) (“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies.”); see also The “Francis Wright,” 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) (stating that Congress may
likewise limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction). But to fulfill the purpose of the diversity
provisions, Congress must have the ability to extend federal jurisdiction to all cases in which the parties
are diverse, if it deems the threat of bias too great.
193
A state could conceivably seek to bias out-of-staters by limiting certain causes of action to
taxpayers or concerned citizens to force out-of-state suits into state court. But that arrangement is
unlikely because, to avoid constitutional problems, those limitations would apply to in-state litigants as
well, and would likely be unpopular. Moreover, limiting causes of action in this way would not prevent
federal actions in a predictable way because whether federal justiciability is satisfied depends not on the
cause of action invoked, but instead on whether there is actual or imminent injury and adversity.
194
183 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 1999).
195
Id. at 491.
196
Further evidence of the belief that the Ohio courts would favor the taxpayers is that the
taxpayers vigorously sought remand to state court. Id. at 491–92.
197
Id. at 494.
198
Id. at 495.
199
See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
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C. Parity Between Federal and State Courts
Applying state justiciability doctrines would also promote parity
between the state and federal courts. As the Supreme Court explained in the
context of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,200 one of the assumptions underlying
diversity jurisdiction is that the enforceability of state rights should not
depend on whether a suit is brought in state or federal court.201 Because
federal courts sitting in diversity are acting as alternative state courts,
parties should have the same rights whether their cases proceed in state or
federal court.202 To provide different rights in state and federal court would
lead to unacceptably different results depending on where the suit is filed
and would encourage forum shopping.203
Of course, Erie requires only that federal courts apply state substantive
law.204 Although scholars have challenged the idea that justiciability is
separate from substance,205 federal courts have consistently treated
justiciability as separate from substantive law, based on the theory that it
does not set forth rights but instead defines whether a court may decide a
dispute.206 But the same concerns motivating Erie extend to justiciability.207
Erie’s premise is that the scope of state rights cannot vary depending on
whether suit is brought in state or federal court because the same state
substantive law empowers both the federal and state court to provide

200

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945). (“[S]ince a federal court adjudicating a
State-created right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in
effect, only another court of the State, it cannot . . . substantially affect the enforcement of the right as
given by the State.”).
202
Id.
203
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (“The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization that
it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because the suit had been
brought in a federal court.”); Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1865, 1893–1900 (2013) (rules that lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of justice are
inconsistent with the goal of providing an unbiased federal forum).
204
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (“Under the Erie doctrine,
federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law . . . .”).
205
See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 12, at 234 (arguing that standing should be considered a merits
determination); Lee, supra note 12, at 669 (making a similar argument for mootness).
206
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2362 (2011) (distinguishing the merits from
justiciability).
207
This is not to say that federal courts must have the same jurisdiction as state courts. Congress
may confer less than the full scope of diversity jurisdiction on federal courts. The point is that federal
courts should be available, if Congress deems it wise, to operate as alternative state courts for enforcing
state rights to the same extent as state courts.
201
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relief.208 Federal courts need not follow state procedures, but they must
enforce the same rights.
Although justiciability rules may seem procedural in the sense that
they regulate courts instead of individuals, categorizing them solely as
procedural is wrong. Justiciability rules do not simply prescribe “the
manner and the means” by which rights are enforced.209 Instead, they define
the “rules of decision” for adjudicating rights by imposing various
requirements on litigants, such as that they have a sufficient stake in the
dispute and that their interests be adverse.210 Those requirements do not
simply determine the means by which a court decides a dispute; rather, they
relate to conduct outside the courtroom by defining when an individual has
a cognizable grievance for which he can obtain judicial redress.
Thus, by following federal instead of state justiciability doctrines in
diversity cases, federal courts functionally enforce different rights than
state courts.211 This difference in the scope of rights may result in different
outcomes in state and federal court and lead litigants to forum shop to
avoid particular outcomes—the two evils that the Erie doctrine seeks to
prevent.212 Indeed, the understanding that justiciability should be treated
similarly to substantive law for Erie purposes underlies the practice of the
lower federal courts to require plaintiffs to satisfy state (as well as federal)
standing rules for state law claims brought under diversity jurisdiction.213
Even so, one might argue that state law should have no bearing on
justiciability in federal court, because federal justiciability turns on the
meaning of cases and controversies in Article III.214 But the fact that federal
208

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467 (stating the goal of Erie was to avoid having “rights . . . vary according
to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court” (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938))).
209
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406 (2010) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)) (noting that procedural
rules can only govern “the manner and the means” by which rights are enforced).
210
Id. (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp., 326 U.S. at 446) (stating that procedural rules may not alter the
“rules of decision” for adjudicating rights).
211
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 650 (2006) (arguing that limitations on
jurisdiction affect enforceability of rights); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 209 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[A] right without a remedy is no right at all for purposes of enforcement by
a diversity suit in a federal court sitting in the state.” (citing Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–
09 (1945))).
212
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at
468). In this sense, justiciability is not procedural. Unlike procedural rules, justiciability does not
simply regulate “the manner and the means” by which rights are enforced; it defines the “rules of
decision” for adjudicating rights by requiring litigants to have adequate interests. Shady Grove, 559
U.S. at 407.
213
See supra note 133.
214
Cf. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 (explaining that under the Erie doctrine, state substantive law
does not apply if the matter is governed by the Constitution).
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justiciability is a question of constitutional law does not preclude following
state justiciability rules in diversity cases. The Constitution often
incorporates aspects of state law. For example, state law often determines
what constitutes “property” under the Due Process and Takings Clauses,215
and it is central to determining whether punishment is cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment.216 The rationale for following state law in
those situations is that doing so is necessary to implement those
constitutional provisions sensibly.217 That same rationale applies to the
justiciability of claims brought under diversity. The motivation for
diversity jurisdiction was to provide an alternative federal forum for state
law disputes between diverse parties, and following state justiciability rules
ensures that federal courts can hear any civil suit meeting that
description.218 In that light, state justiciability doctrines should inform the
meaning of “controversies” in diversity cases. This is not to say that federal
justiciability should be a question of state law—it should not be. Whether
disputes in federal court constitute “controversies” is a constitutional
question. Rather, the point is that state law should give content to the
meaning of the term “controversies.”
The argument for following state justiciability doctrines is all the
stronger when viewing the rules of federal justiciability as judicially
created rather than compelled by the text of Article III.219 When courts
create doctrine implementing vague constitutional text, they should seek to
accomplish the goals underlying the text being implemented so as to avoid
accusations of unbridled judicial lawmaking.220 Following state
justiciability doctrines in diversity cases best accomplishes the goal of
allowing federal courts to function as alternative state courts.221
215

Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“[Property interests] are
created . . . by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law . . . .”); see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163–64 (1998) (applying same
analysis to takings).
216
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2010) (looking to state law to determine the national
consensus).
217
See id.; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
218
See supra Part II.B.
219
See supra note 24 and accompanying text; cf. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90,
98 (1991) (stating that, when creating federal common law, federal courts should “incorporat[e] [state
law] as the federal rule of decision” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979))).
220
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1997) (describing doctrine as effort to implement
constitutional values).
221
Applying state justiciability doctrines would also have the potential to improve justiciability
doctrine overall. The process of applying a variety of different state justiciability doctrines would
provide federal judges with insights on ways to improve federal justiciability doctrines, an area of law
known for its complexity and incoherence. See Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of
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Following state justiciability rules would undermine uniformity in
justiciability rules in federal court because different states have different
justiciability rules. But there is no federal interest in establishing a uniform
rule of justiciability for state law suits brought under diversity jurisdiction.
To the contrary, the diversity provisions implement the federal interest in
protecting out-of-state interests from the real or perceived biases of state
courts, and following state justiciability doctrines better achieves that
goal.222 Although doing so may lead to differences among federal courts in
different states,223 it creates greater uniformity between federal courts and
the courts of the states in which they sit—a preferable outcome given that
federal courts function as state courts under diversity jurisdiction.224
Nor would following state justiciability doctrines imperil some other
important federal interest. The current federal justiciability doctrines are
not an essential characteristic of the federal judiciary.225 They are neither
dictated by the text of Article III nor have they always been understood to
be critical to defining federal jurisdiction. To the contrary, with the possible
exceptions of the political question doctrine and the advisory opinion
doctrine,226 these doctrines are relatively recent judicial creations, and they
continue to evolve even today.227 Moreover, unlike cases presenting federal
or constitutional questions or suits involving the United States, suits
involving only issues of state law brought under diversity jurisdiction do
not inherently implicate national interests. They involve questions of
Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 123 (2000) (noting the value
of dialogue between state and federal courts in developing individual rights); Martin H. Redish,
Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal
Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1773 (1992) (discussing the value of
“cross-pollination” between state and federal courts in developing doctrine). Likewise, federal judges
would have opportunities to suggest ways to improve state justiciability doctrines in the course of
applying those doctrines.
222
See supra Parts II.A–B.
223
Federal justiciability determinations already vary because of state law. For example, federal
courts require satisfaction of both state and federal standing requirements. See supra note 133. Further,
state law may affect the existence of federal standing. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that
his alleged injury in fact is judicially cognizable—that is, the injury must involve the “violation of a
legally protected right.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772–73
(2000). State law may provide the legal right that renders an injury cognizable. See, e.g., Booker-El v.
Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899–900 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that state law
creates cognizable interests for standing).
224
Cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941) (explaining that although
Erie leads to lack of uniformity in substantive law, that “lack of uniformity . . . is attributable to our
federal system”).
225
Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537–38 (1958) (holding that right to a
jury is an essential characteristic of federal courts under the Seventh Amendment and therefore that
federal courts must empanel juries for state law claims even when state law permits a bench trial).
226
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
227
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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importance only to the state.228 One might argue that federal courts should
follow state justiciability rules but only as long as they do not conflict with
the case or controversy requirement of Article III. But that simply begs the
question, because justiciability provides the basis for defining what
constitutes a case or controversy in the first place. Article III does not
define those terms, and courts must develop these doctrines through
reference to another source.
To be sure, it may seem that the rationale behind some state
justiciability doctrines does not extend to federal courts. For example, one
reason behind the exceptions to the usual justiciability requirements for
cases presenting issues of public importance is to allow the state court to
resolve recurrent issues by writing precedential opinions.229 That reason
applies less to federal courts because their determinations of state law have
limited precedential value.230 But fashioning binding precedent is not the
only reason for this exception; otherwise, the exception would not be
available to state trial courts that cannot issue opinions that bind in future
cases. Another reason for the exception is to allow a court to issue a
binding judgment on the parties in a particular dispute to resolve the
dispute with respect to those parties, and federal courts can equally fill this
function. Although some of the reasons underlying some state justiciability
might not support federal jurisdiction, most of those doctrines have
multiple goals, and many of those goals do support federal jurisdiction.
III. THE REASONS FOR FEDERAL JUSTICIABILITY
The prior Part explained that applying separate federal justiciability
doctrines in state law diversity actions conflicts with the purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. One might argue, however, that the reasons for
federal justiciability doctrines nevertheless warrant the application of those
doctrines to diversity cases. But that is not so. The rationales underlying
federal justiciability doctrines do not extend to diversity cases that turn
solely on state law. The main rationale for federal justiciability—separation
of powers—does not apply to cases brought under diversity jurisdiction
because the other branches of the federal government have no role in the
creation or enforcement of state law. The other major rationale offered by
courts—institutional competence—likewise does not justify following
federal justiciability doctrines because state law should determine when a
228

13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 3531.14, at 298 (“Federal concepts of standing
developed to regulate enforcement of federal rights do not represent any independent interest of the
federal courts that justifies disregarding state law in [diversity cases].”).
229
See, e.g., In re Commitment of Schulpius, 707 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Wis. 2006) (recognizing
exception to mootness for recurrent issues).
230
See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941) (describing a federal
court determination of state law as merely a “forecast rather than a determination”).
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court is competent to resolve a state law dispute. Nor do other reasons
sometimes given for the federal justiciability doctrines—fairness and
conservation of judicial resources—justify the use of those doctrines in
state law diversity cases.
A. Separation of Powers
Separation of powers is the central idea underlying the justiciability
doctrines implementing Article III.231 According to the Supreme Court, the
case or controversy provisions of Article III “define the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power” among the judiciary, the
President, and Congress.232 Federal justiciability doctrines implement those
provisions by ensuring that the federal courts stay within their sphere of
power and do not “usurp the powers of the political branches.”233
As noted in Part I, the appropriate role of the federal judiciary is a
matter of dispute. Some argue that the federal courts should be limited to
enforcing private rights, whereas others contend that the federal courts
should take a more active role in articulating and policing legal norms.234
Both models recognize, however, that constraints must be placed on the
judiciary to avoid undue interference with Congress and the President.235
The difference between the models lies only in where to define the
boundaries between the judicial power and the legislative and executive
powers.
But that debate has no place in diversity cases that depend solely on
state law. Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction over state law
disputes pose no threat to the powers of President or Congress. Neither
does Congress have any say over the content of state law,236 nor does the
President have any involvement in the enforcement of state law.237 The role
of federal courts in those cases is not to vindicate national interests.238
231

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating that justiciability is “built on a single basic
idea—the idea of separation of powers”); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138,
1146–47 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing . . . is built on separation-of-powers principles . . . .”).
232
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
233
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146.
234
See supra Part I.A.
235
Siegel, supra note 8, at 123, 125 (arguing that even under a “special functions” model, “courts
would still play only a ‘proper—and properly limited—role . . . in a democratic society’” (quoting Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984))).
236
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot direct
enactment of state laws).
237
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008) (noting the President’s inability to control
enforcement of state law when no federal law is implicated).
238
To be sure, one of the fears motivating diversity was that forcing out-of-staters or foreigners
into state court could lead dissatisfied litigants to violence. But there is no generalized national interest
in preventing violence; otherwise, all cases could be brought in federal court.
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Instead, the federal courts operate as alternative state courts, resolving
issues of state law.239 Thus, for those state law disputes, the separation of
powers concerns underlying federal justiciability doctrines do not apply.
To be sure, concerns about separation of powers may be greater in
suits between diverse parties that do not turn solely on state law, but
instead also raise questions of federal or constitutional law. Article III
extends the judicial power to such suits both because the parties are diverse
and because the cases arise under federal law240—how the court resolves a
federal or constitutional question may affect the federal government’s
interests. Accordingly, there may be reason to apply federal justiciability
principles in those cases, even when the parties are diverse.241 But when a
dispute does not present a federal or constitutional question, as is the case
for many disputes brought under diversity jurisdiction, those separation-ofpowers concerns do not apply.242
239

England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 426–27 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“The diversity jurisdiction . . . was generally to afford to suitors an opportunity . . . to
assert their rights in the federal rather than in the state courts.” (quoting Meredith v. City of Winter
Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943))). Diversity jurisdiction, therefore, is an exception to the general rule
that the powers of the branches of the federal government are commensurate. See Henry J. Friendly, In
Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 394–95 (1964). It
allows courts to hear cases involving matters beyond the jurisdiction of the President and Congress
when the parties are diverse. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435–36 (1793) (opinion of
Iredell, J.) (“Where certain parties are concerned, although the subject in controversy does not relate to
any of the special objects of authority of the general Government, . . . the general Government has a
Judicial Authority in regard to such subjects of controversy . . . .”).
240
Although Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), holds that Article
III’s arising under provision extends to those cases in which federal law forms an unlitigated ingredient
of the case, the Court has questioned whether that interpretation of Article III is too broad. See
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492–93 (1983) (noting the question but
declining to resolve it). In any event, separation of powers concerns are minimal when a federal issue is
merely an underlying ingredient instead of a disputed matter in a case, because such cases do not
present an occasion for the courts to rule on the federal issue. The argument in this Article accordingly
extends to that circumstance.
241
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), Congress has limited “arising under” jurisdiction to cases in
which the cause of action presents a federal question. See Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804, 807–08 (1986). That statute does not confer federal jurisdiction over cases that present only a
federal defense, even though those cases “arise under” federal law for Article III purposes. See id. In
those cases, diverse parties seeking to litigate in federal court must invoke diversity jurisdiction. Still,
there may be separation of powers concerns warranting the application of the federal justiciability
doctrines if those cases turn on federal law.
242
One might argue that, when a plaintiff brings a state law claim under diversity jurisdiction and a
federal claim arising from the same transaction, those claims form the same case and, therefore, that the
federal justiciability requirements should apply to the state law claim. But the Court has consistently
refused to treat multiple claims as a single case in evaluating justiciability. Instead, it has evaluated
justiciability independently for each claim. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352–53
(2006) (refusing to apply supplemental jurisdiction to justiciability); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (arguing that standing for past harm does not establish standing to seek
prospective relief). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law
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Although following state justiciability doctrines in state law diversity
cases would not lead federal courts to infringe on the other branches of the
federal government, one might argue that applying state doctrines
nevertheless violates the separation of powers by expanding the power of
the judiciary. The Supreme Court has espoused this view. It has explained
that Article III confers on the federal courts the power to decide only those
disputes “traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial
process,”243 and for a federal court to exercise power beyond these
historical limitations violates the separation of powers.244 According to the
Court, the federal justiciability doctrines ensure that the federal courts are
limited to that historical role.245
It may be that limiting the federal judiciary to its historical role was
the origin of some federal justiciability doctrines. But federal justiciability
doctrines have evolved over time, and they no longer limit the federal
judiciary to its historical role. For example, historically, whether a plaintiff
had standing did not depend on whether he had suffered injury in fact;
rather, standing depended on whether the plaintiff had invoked the proper
form of action.246 The Supreme Court first created the injury in fact test in
1970.247 Mootness doctrine has changed as well. It was only in 1911, for
example, that the Court first recognized the capable of repetition yet
evading review exception,248 and the scope of that exception has changed
over time.249 Ripeness has undergone a similar evolution: courts now hear
some cases that historically would not have been ripe.250 So, too, for the

Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1984) (summarizing and
criticizing doctrine). By that rationale, a single justiciability doctrine need not apply to state and federal
claims in one case. Instead, state claims may be evaluated under state justiciability doctrines, whereas
federal claims may be evaluated under federal doctrines.
243
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102.
244
See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (limiting federal justiciability to
disputes “‘historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process’ . . . ensures that we
act as judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives” (quoting Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968))). But see Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (suggesting that limiting courts to
their historical function is independent from separation of powers).
245
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
246
See Sunstein, supra note 145, at 184.
247
Fletcher, supra note 12, at 224.
248
See S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515–16 (1911); see also David H. Donaldson,
Jr., Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the Federal Courts: Part One—The Continuing
Impact Doctrines, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1306 (1976) (discussing development of the exception).
249
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 335–36 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that, under
original exception, plaintiff had to demonstrate that he faced a reasonable probability of suffering the
harm again, but that exception was expanded to include instances where someone else faced a threat of
facing the harm).
250
Compare Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (finding ripe a claim that global
warming might cause coastal damage in several decades), with Attorney Gen. v. Kingston-on-Thames,
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prohibition on nonadversarial suits: In 1804, the Supreme Court resolved a
case while acknowledging that it involved only “a feigned issue.”251
Following state justiciability doctrines in diversity cases may actually
better align with history. Historically, justiciability was not clearly separate
from substantive law. Courts could hear a claim when a party “assert[ed]
his rights in the form prescribed by law”252—a requirement that sounds in
the merits. Because federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state
substantive law,253 applying that historical test today would lead federal
courts sitting in diversity to follow state justiciability rules as well—
because it would require federal courts to reconceptualize justiciability as
substantive law.254 Further, many state justiciability doctrines actually hew
more closely to the historical line than the federal doctrines. For example,
in some states, standing turns on whether the plaintiff properly states a
claim255—a requirement that closely mirrors the historical rule that
justiciability depended on plaintiffs asserting their rights “in the form
prescribed by law.”256
There may be situations where the state defines its judicial power to
extend far beyond the traditional notion of the judicial power. For example,
a state may redefine its “judicial power” to include the power to issue
nonbinding opinions.257 Although the Supreme Court has stated that the

(1865) 34 H.L. 481 at 487 (Eng.) (deeming unripe a claim against dumping sewage into the Thames
because any harm from dumping might not arise for “a hundred years hence”).
251
Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 33–34 (1804).
252
Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824) (“[The judicial] power is
capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form
prescribed by law.”); see also Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926) (stating that Article III
is satisfied “[w]henever the law provides a remedy enforceable in the courts according to the regular
course of legal procedure, and that remedy is pursued”). Professors Woolhandler and Nelson have
argued that historically merely stating a cause of action was insufficient to create standing. See Ann
Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 721
(2004). But the earliest example they provide is from 1911, id. (citing Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346 (1911)), by which time justiciability doctrines had already departed from their roots.
253
See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
254
See Hessick, supra note 18, at 425.
255
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
256
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 819.
257
The hypothetical is farfetched because it would be a poor use of resources and depart from the
common understanding of the judicial power among the states. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514
U.S. 211, 224 (1995) (recounting the shared historical view of states that the judicial power is the power
to render binding judgments). One can imagine even more outlandish hypotheticals, such as redefining
the judicial power to include the power to legislate. Assuming such arrangements are constitutional, but
see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing to each state a republican form of government), and that the
diversity requirement could be satisfied, federal courts should have the Article III power to hear cases
brought under this scheme but also the power to abstain or deny the remedy if appropriate, see infra
note 305.
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federal judicial power is the power to render dispositive judgments,258
federal courts sitting in diversity should still follow the state laws of
justiciability in those situations.259
By authorizing an individual to bring suit that has the remedy of
obtaining a judicial opinion on the law, the state law has conferred on that
individual a right to know the law, and it has prescribed a remedy for a
violation of that right—a nonbinding opinion from the courts. For
justiciability purposes, the suit is no different from any other suit in which
the individual seeks to vindicate a right—the traditional basis for
justiciability in federal courts and still a common ground for justiciability
in state courts.260 The objection to empowering a court to issue a
nonbinding opinion is one of remedy. But as the Court recognized long
ago, Article III does not “crystallize” the remedies available.261 Legislatures
may create new remedies, and if a state determines that its courts should
have the power to vindicate rights through the remedy of a nonbinding
opinion, federal courts sitting as alternative state courts in diversity should
have that same power. To the extent that the remedy is a poor use of
judicial resources, Congress may limit diversity jurisdiction through
legislation, and courts may develop doctrines of abstention.262 But the
deficiency of the remedy should not categorically prohibit a federal court
from hearing the dispute.
B. Institutional Competence
The Supreme Court has said “the business of federal courts” is to
resolve “questions presented in an adversary context.”263 For a dispute to be
sufficiently adverse, it must have at least two opposing parties, each of
which is asserting conflicting rights and each of which has a stake in
winning the dispute.264 According to the Court, this adverseness is
necessary to “sharpen[] the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends.”265 In other words, adverseness promotes better litigation,
258

See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219.
The diversity requirement would not be obviously satisfied because a request for an opinion
need not be brought against another party. But one can imagine a statute authorizing suit against another
simply to obtain a judicial pronouncement. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012) (authorizing declaratory
judgments).
260
See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 233.
261
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (holding declaratory judgments
justiciable).
262
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (identifying
various forms of abstention). See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 580–85 (1985) (summarizing this area of law).
263
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
264
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 469 (2008).
265
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
259
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which leads to better judicial decisions266—and the federal justiciability
doctrines ensure this adverseness.267
This rationale does not support applying federal justiciability doctrines
to state law cases in diversity. State law dictates when state courts are
competent to act.268 Because federal courts act as state courts when hearing
state law suits in diversity, that same state law should determine when
federal courts are competent to hear those claims. States may adopt a
different understanding of when a dispute is sufficiently adverse for
judicial resolution, and many have done so through their differing
justiciability doctrines.269
One might argue that adverseness is more beneficial to federal than
state judges because federal judges know less about state law than state
courts. That argument does not account for those states that demand more
adverseness than is required under federal doctrines.270 More important,
whether federal judges know less state law than state judges is an empirical
question. Some federal judges may actually know state law better than
some judges of that state because federal judges are often picked from
among leaders of the state bars.271 Moreover, not all state judges know state
law equally. There is always a risk that a state judge, especially a newly
appointed one, is unfamiliar with a particular area of law in a dispute. State
laws permitting judicial resolution of disputes in the absence of substantial
adverseness operates on the premise that, irrespective of a particular
judge’s knowledge and experience, that judge is capable of resolving that
dispute without the adverseness required by federal justiciability doctrine.
Thus, even if federal courts would benefit from greater adverseness, that
adverseness is not necessary to adjudicate the state claim.272 In any event,
the federal justiciability doctrines are not particularly effective at ensuring
high-quality advocacy. An interest group that does not have a sufficient
266

Hessick, supra note 50, at 322.
E.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2035 (2011) (invoking adversity to justify mootness);
Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (invoking adversity to justify standing).
268
Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No.
9662) (opinion of Story, J.) (“The states . . . have a right to limit, control, and restrict their judicial
functions, and jurisdiction, according to their own mere pleasure.”).
269
See supra Part I.B.
270
See, e.g., Yancy v. Shatzer, 97 P.3d 1161, 1171 (Or. 2004) (rejecting the capable of repetition
yet evading review exception to mootness).
271
Sandra D. O’Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 812 (1981) (“[M]any appointments
to the federal bench are from state court benches.”).
272
Indeed, federal courts may be better equipped to resolve cases in the absence of strong advocacy
because of their access to greater resources. See William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in
Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1744 (1992).
Moreover, if an issue proves particularly difficult to resolve, the federal court may certify the question
to the state supreme court. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 74 (1997).
267
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stake to satisfy the justiciability requirements may nevertheless litigate
more vigorously than an individual who actually has a sufficient stake.273
A second argument supporting greater adverseness for federal courts is
that resolving legal questions in a non-adverse context resembles
lawmaking more than adjudication, and state judiciaries may more
appropriately engage in lawmaking because their members may be subject
to elections.274 This argument does not extend to those states in which
judges are not elected, which amounts to about half the states.275
More importantly, this argument rests on the false assumption that
federal justiciability doctrines actually guarantee adverseness. Various
federal doctrines allow federal courts to resolve disputes even when the
parties are not adverse. For example, under the capable of repetition yet
evading review exception to mootness, a court will not dismiss a claim that
is otherwise moot if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant will
again engage in the complained-of conduct. In that situation, the plaintiff
no longer has a real stake in the case—an order favorable to the plaintiff
will not provide the plaintiff with tangible relief—yet the courts have
deemed themselves competent to resolve the dispute. Similarly, the
interests required to satisfy federal justiciability doctrines need not be tied
to the merits of the case. For example, the injuries giving rise to federal
standing often have no bearing on the legal issue before the court,276 and
once a court finds standing, it may discuss any legal issue in its decision.277
The adverseness ensured by standing, therefore, has no bearing on the issue
on which the court may make new law. Indeed, in its most recent decision
on standing, the Court itself said that the adverseness basis for justiciability
is merely a prudential consideration.278

273

See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 891 (1983).
274
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1185 (1999). Finally, that state judges may be subject to elections is a
reason why federalism should not limit justiciability in cases brought under diversity jurisdiction.
Judges facing elections are more likely to be biased in favor of their state and its citizens against out-ofstate litigants. See Richard L. Hasen, “High Court Wrongly Elected”: A Public Choice Model of
Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1313–14 (1997) (arguing
that, under public choice theory, elected judges will aim to please the electorate).
275
Issacharoff, supra note 175, at 118.
276
David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for
Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 823–24 (2004) (arguing that justiciability
requirements usually do not affect a court’s analysis of the merits).
277
See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249, 1269 (2006) (noting the widespread acceptance of dicta).
278
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2687 (2013).
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C. Fairness
Another reason given for federal justiciability doctrines is that they
serve the interest of fairness.279 According to this theory, rightsholders
should have the prerogative to determine whether to enforce their rights;
third parties should not be permitted to raise the rights of others who do not
want to enforce their own rights or have not yet had an opportunity to do
so.280 Federal justiciability doctrines protect this structure by allowing only
those with a substantial stake in a dispute to pursue litigation.281
But what constitutes a substantial enough stake to warrant litigation is
a question of law. Under federal doctrine, any amount of money constitutes
a sufficient interest to invoke the judicial process,282 but emotional distress,
even when severe, resulting from observing the government’s or some
other person’s illegal conduct, is not.283 State doctrines often draw a
different line. For example, some states have decreed that ensuring
government compliance with the law is an adequate interest to invoke the
judiciary.284
The law that creates a right also establishes who has an adequate basis
to enforce that right. For example, a law authorizing all people to bring suit
to enforce a permitting requirement for property improvements creates in
all people an interest in the enforcement of the requirement.285 Because a
federal court faced with a state law suit brought under diversity jurisdiction
must enforce that right to the same degree as state courts,286 that same state
law should dictate which individuals have a sufficient interest to seek to
enforce that law.
D. Judicial Resources
Another reason for federal justiciability doctrines is to deploy
effectively finite judicial resources.287 Federal courts have limited time and
279

See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or
Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306–15 (1979).
280
Id. at 310.
281
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 473 (1982) (“[S]tanding also reflects a due regard for the autonomy of those persons likely to be
most directly affected by a judicial order.”).
282
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973) (allowing suit based on any “identifiable trifle”).
283
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486.
284
See, e.g., New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Martinez, 247 P.3d 286, 290–91 (N.M. 2011) (granting
standing when “the Governor and the Secretary have exceeded the limits of their constitutional
powers”); Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082 (Ohio 1999) (basing
standing on interest in preventing unconstitutional legislation).
285
See Sunstein, supra note 145, at 234–35.
286
Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1945).
287
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at § 2.1, 43–44.
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money. They also have limited political capital: Federal courts depend on
other institutions to enforce their orders, and if a court enters too many
disfavored decisions, those other institutions may refuse to enforce the
federal orders.288 Federal justiciability doctrines let the federal courts
expend these resources effectively by screening out those disputes ill-suited
for judicial resolution.
Following state justiciability doctrines is unlikely to result in a
substantial increase in the expenditure of federal judicial resources. State
judiciaries also have finite resources, and states have an interest in
expending those resources wisely. Presumably, one way that states
accomplish that goal is through their justiciability doctrines. Although
some states may have more permissive justiciability doctrines than the
federal ones, their need to conserve resources supports the idea that the
greater scope of justiciability does not overly tax the state court system.
Requiring federal courts to follow state justiciability doctrines in diversity
thus would not likely result in a substantial increase in the expenditure of
federal resources.
Of course, the differences in state and federal justiciability doctrines
may result in federal courts expending their resources differently under
state justiciability doctrines than they would under federal justiciability
doctrines. But state law should control which state claims warrant judicial
attention. To allocate federal resources according to federal doctrines is to
prioritize federal over state interests in cases that present no federal
interest.
To the extent state justiciability doctrines do result in a poor use of
federal judicial resources, Congress may redirect the use of those federal
judicial resources by limiting diversity jurisdiction through statute, as it has
done with the amount in controversy requirement,289 which prevents federal
courts from expending resources under diversity jurisdiction on small
disputes.290
IV. FEDERALISM AND DISPARITY OBJECTIONS
Although the rationales underlying federal justiciability doctrines do
not justify applying those doctrines to diversity cases, there may be other
reasons to apply federal justiciability in those cases. One might argue that
federal justiciability doctrines protect federalism or that following state
288

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
POLITICS 116 (2d ed. 1986); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 55–59 (1980).
289
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
290
Indeed, Congress could mandate through legislation the current federal justiciability
requirements in diversity cases.
OF
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justiciability doctrines in diversity cases leads to unwarranted disparities in
justiciability between cases presenting federal questions and cases brought
under diversity. But neither objection warrants applying federal instead of
state justiciability doctrines in state law diversity cases.
A. Federalism
Federalism defines the distribution of power between the federal and
state governments.291 Under our political system, states have general
regulatory power.292 By contrast, the federal government is one of limited
powers.293 It may exercise only those powers enumerated in the
Constitution and cannot exercise those powers left to the states. One might
argue that the federal justiciability doctrines protect this division of power
by limiting the federal judiciary’s ability to meddle in state affairs.
But federalism should not limit the power of federal courts to exercise
diversity jurisdiction. The very point of diversity jurisdiction is to enable
federal courts to hear issues of state law that might not involve federal
interests.294 Diversity thus is a departure from the ordinary balance of
power between the state and federal governments.295 Although allowing
federal courts to hear state issues may imperil state sovereignty to some
degree,296 the Founders thought this jurisdiction was necessary to maintain
order and the rule of law among the states.
Even if federalism does prohibit federal courts from hearing certain
state matters, federal justiciability doctrines are not targeted at that goal.
Federal courts have not developed justiciability doctrines with an eye
towards protecting state sovereignty.297 Instead, their focus in fashioning
291

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
293
See id.
294
See supra Part II.B.
295
Cf. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1873 (2013) (stating federalism is
irrelevant to situations where the federal government is empowered to act). The one limitation on
diversity jurisdiction based on federalism is the Eleventh Amendment, which courts have interpreted to
prohibit federal courts generally from hearing suits by individuals against a state without its consent.
P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
296
Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1675 (1992).
297
Particularly illuminating is Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). There, the Court
considered whether a request for a judgment declaring a threatened prosecution for a state crime
unconstitutional presented a justiciable controversy and, if so, whether a district court appropriately
denied the declaratory judgment. If federalism underlay the justiciability doctrines, one would expect
federalism to appear prominently in the justiciability analysis because the requested judgment would
interfere with the state’s prosecutorial function. Yet the Court did not mention federalism in that portion
of its analysis. Id. at 459–60. By contrast, the Court discussed federalism extensively in determining
whether the district court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying declaratory relief. Id. at 460–
62.
292
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those doctrines has been on defining which disputes the federal courts may
resolve and which disputes should be left to the federal political
branches.298 Consequently, those doctrines do not sort cases based on
whether they involve national issues or local issues more appropriately
handled by the states. Instead, they ask whether the dispute has
characteristics that render it susceptible to judicial resolution.299 As long as
a dispute has those characteristics, a federal court may hear the suit, even if
it involves an important state issue such as the processes employed by state
administrative agencies or the scope of state common laws.300
Nor do the federal justiciability doctrines protect federalism by
ensuring that federal courts do not unduly interfere with the state executive
or legislative branches. Federal justiciability doctrines enforce the federal
allocation of power among the courts, executive, and legislature. Many
states have rejected the federal arrangement of power in favor of different
allocations of power among their governmental departments. For instance,
some states do not place all executive power in a single office but instead
disperse it among several elected officials; some allow direct participation
of their citizens through popular referenda; and some confer more power on
their judges because those judges are subject to elections.301 These
To be sure, in Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 573–74 (1947), the
Court arguably suggested in dicta that one consideration in determining whether a dispute is justiciable
is whether the dispute comes “from state courts involving state legislation . . . [that] remain[s]
unresolved or highly ambiguous.” But the Court’s opinion is ambiguous and can be equally read as
saying that the clarity of state law is relevant only to determining whether a court should abstain from
hearing a challenge to the constitutionality of state law, not whether there exists a case or controversy.
This latter reading seems more sensible given that the existence of a dispute capable of judicial
resolution should not turn on the clarity of the law, and is more consistent with the Court’s subsequent
abstention decisions.
Highly respected treatises also do not discuss federalism as a basis for justiciability. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at § 2.1, 42–46; FALLON ET AL., supra note 36, at 80–153, 183–248; 13
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 129, § 3529, at 611–39. The one notable exception is Professor Tribe’s
treatise, which states that federalism informs justiciability doctrines, see 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.28, at 567–68 (3d ed. 2000), but the citation he provides does
not support the claim, see id. § 3.28 at 568 (“Warnings against premature adjudication of constitutional
questions bear heightened attention when a federal court is asked to invalidate a State’s law, for the
federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it endeavors to construe a novel state Act not yet
reviewed by the State’s highest court.” (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,
79 (1997))). The cited quotation discusses how abstention and certification promote federalism; it does
not pertain to cases or controversies.
298
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (justiciability “defin[es] the role assigned to the judiciary
in a tripartite allocation of power” among the judiciary, the President, and Congress).
299
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
300
See City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 168–71 (1997) (concluding that a
challenge to conclusions of state administrative determination was justiciable); Cleveland Hous.
Renewal Project v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 621 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding standing to
challenge state nuisance laws).
301
Hershkoff, supra note 53, at 1886–96 (giving examples of states with these characteristics).
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differences and others affect how the states structure their justiciability
doctrines.302 Applying federal justiciability in diversity cases therefore does
not faithfully enforce the state’s scheme for directing who should decide a
particular dispute.
Instead of relying on justiciability to promote federalism,303 federal
courts have developed discretionary doctrines to protect federalism.304 For
example, under various abstention doctrines, federal courts may decline to
hear claims if doing so will interfere with important state interests.305
Likewise, courts have cited federalism in developing prudential
jurisdictional rules, such as third-party standing.306 Federalism has also
guided federal courts in deciding whether to award equitable relief307 and in
fashioning the scope of those remedies.308 Federalism has also informed
interpretations of jurisdictional statutes.309 But Article III commands none
of these doctrines. Instead, they are prudential doctrines and doctrines of
statutory interpretation.
Federalism might provide a stronger case for imposing tighter federal
limitations on justiciability in diversity cases if federal courts were not
bound to follow state law as interpreted by the state courts, as was the case
302

See id.
Although justiciability doctrines do not seek to promote federalism, courts may use justiciability
doctrines to protect state interests. See Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing that justiciability doctrines were not created with federalism in mind, but explaining that
justiciability could nevertheless be used to further federalism). For example, courts may be quicker to
dismiss for lack of justiciability a suit seeking particularly intrusive remedies against a state or its
officers. See Fallon, supra note 211, at 650 (arguing that fear of entering intrusive remedies against a
state may explain otherwise inconsistent standing rulings). But that argument does not establish that the
justiciability doctrines are designed to protect federalism. Rather, it shows only that the federal courts
may employ justiciability doctrines to protect federalism.
304
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, §§ 11.1–14.4, at 763–919 (listing discretionary
doctrines protecting federalism); Shapiro, supra note 262, at 580–85 (explaining how federalism
informs discretionary doctrines whether to exercise jurisdiction).
305
See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (abstaining to avoid interference with
certain civil state cases); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (directing federal courts to abstain
from issuing injunctions barring state criminal prosecutions); La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25 (1959) (requiring abstention in cases that implicate an important “sovereign prerogative” and in
which state law is unclear); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (directing federal courts to
abstain to avoid interfering with administration of the state regulatory scheme).
306
E.g., Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing federalism as a reason to
deny statutory standing).
307
See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (“[R]ecognition of the need for a
proper balance between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions
against state officers engaged in the administration of the States’ criminal laws . . . .”).
308
See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1977) (explaining federal courts should
narrowly tailor injunctive relief against local government officers to avoid interfering with that
government’s operations).
309
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14
(2005) (invoking federalism to limit interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
303
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for suits involving “general” common law before the Supreme Court’s
decision in Erie.310 In that situation, federal courts would pose a greater
threat to state sovereignty because they could control state law to some
degree through their interpretations.311 But federal courts are bound to
follow state law as interpreted by the state courts. They must follow state
supreme court decisions on the content of all substantive state law,312 or do
their best to ascertain how the state supreme court would rule when it has
not passed on the issue.313 Because of these constraints, federal courts do
not pose a threat warranting federal justiciability doctrines.
Far from enforcing federalism, imposing federal justiciability
requirements may undermine federalism. In those situations where a
federal justiciability doctrine is more liberal than a state justiciability
doctrine, a federal court’s decision to follow federal justiciability doctrine
may result in the federal court ruling where the state would not permit it.
For example, if a state chooses not to recognize any exceptions to the
mootness doctrine, a federal court following federal doctrine might still
hear a state law case that is otherwise moot under the capable of repetition
yet evading review exception. Yet doing so would disturb the state
allocation of powers by allowing a court to decide an issue that the state
has determined is inappropriate for judicial resolution. Likewise, when a
federal court refuses to hear a claim justiciable under state law, that court
undermines state sovereignty by refusing to apply state law.314 Through that
determination, the federal court impairs the ability of litigants to pursue
their claims under state law even when they are entitled to do so.315

310

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Moreover, if they did not follow state interpretations, federal courts sitting in diversity would
not function as alternative forums for the state courts, because they would be applying different
substantive law than state courts. Federal courts would be applying federal interpretations of state law,
while state courts would follow state interpretations of state law. Because federal courts would not be
acting as state courts, there would be less reason to follow state justiciability doctrines.
312
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (describing scope of Erie). This
is not to say that Erie completely eliminated the federal court’s effect on state law. When a state
supreme court has not decided an issue, the federal court must predict how the state court would decide
the issue. That speculation may influence the development of state law. See Sloviter, supra note 296, at
1676–79. But the states have the ultimate say on the content of their law, and they may reject the federal
court’s determination.
313
In some ways, Erie reduced the ability of the federal courts to combat state bias against out-ofstate litigants. States may exhibit bias against out-of-state litigants by developing doctrines that disfavor
those litigants, and under Erie, federal courts must apply those biased state court doctrines. See Patrick
J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World
for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 86–87 (1993).
314
Cf. Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734–35, 739–41 (2009) (holding that, because they must
apply federal law, states usually cannot refuse to hear federal claims).
315
Of course, litigants could file in state court instead of federal court, but that does not cure the
federal judiciary’s interference with state sovereignty.
311

103

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Following state justiciability doctrines in state law diversity cases would
avoid these problems.
B. Inconsistent Justiciability Doctrines
One might object that applying state justiciability doctrines in
diversity cases would lead to unwarranted inconsistencies in determining
justiciability in federal court. There would no longer be a single set of
justiciability doctrines in federal court. Instead, federal justiciability
doctrines would apply to cases arising under federal law and other disputes
raising federal interests, but state justiciability doctrines would control state
law controversies brought under diversity jurisdiction.
But a single justiciability doctrine need not apply to all types of
dispute. As mentioned earlier, justiciability doctrines are not commanded
by the text of Article III. Those doctrines largely originated as self-imposed
limitations on the judicial power and were tied to Article III only later.316
And even since being tied to Article III, the federal justiciability doctrines
have continued to develop in a common-law-like process.317 Because
justiciability is a judicially created concept, courts should develop
justiciability doctrines in a way that reflects the reasons and concerns
underlying particular grants of federal judicial power.318
Applying a single justiciability test to all the various types of disputes
in Article III does not accomplish this goal. Different values and concerns
are at stake in each of the various categories of dispute in Article III. For
example, the principal reasons for federal jurisdiction over cases arising
under federal law are to promote uniform interpretation of federal law and
to protect federal interests,319 but pursuing these goals presents a risk that
the judiciary might interfere with the other branches of the federal
government.320 By contrast, the primary reason for diversity jurisdiction is
to prevent discrimination against certain litigants, and hearing those claims
does not raise separation of powers concerns.321 These different
considerations suggest that the same justiciability doctrines should not
apply to these two divergent categories of dispute. Instead, justiciability
doctrines should be tailored to allow federal courts to accomplish the goals
underlying the respective jurisdictional grants to the extent they can
without raising other concerns.
316

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
318
Cf. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (1921) (explaining that
the common law should evolve to reflect society’s changing sense of morality, justice, and fairness).
319
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, § 5.2.1, at 284.
320
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 473–74 (1982).
321
See supra text accompanying notes 170 and 236–39.
317
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Moreover, although this Article’s argument is not based on the text of
Article III because that text does not provide the foundation for the content
of the justiciability doctrines,322 the text does support the notion that federal
courts may not play precisely the same role in each of the nine types of
disputes delineated in Article III. In defining the scope of the judicial
power, Article III does not describe the nine types of disputes identically.
Instead, for six categories of disputes, including diversity jurisdiction,
Article III empowers the federal courts to hear “controversies.”323 For the
other three types of disputes, Article III empowers the federal courts to hear
“cases.”324 Although there is disagreement on the significance of the
different terms,325 Professor Pushaw has cogently argued that the difference
in terminology may reflect a different scope of federal judicial power for
those types of disputes.326 Article III itself thus may contemplate that the
doctrines implementing “controversies” brought in diversity may differ
from the doctrines implementing “cases.”327
Of course, by the same logic, the repeated use of the term
“controversy” may signify a decision to impose the same justiciability
requirements to all those disputes referred to as “controversies.”328
Although thoroughly assessing that argument is beyond the scope of this
Article, on first glance that conclusion seems reasonable. Five of the six
categories of “controversies” are forms of diversity jurisdiction. The same
reason for extending federal jurisdiction—potential bias in state court—
underlies each grant, which suggests that the same justiciability rules
should apply.
The final category of “controversies” comprises disputes to which the
United States is a party.329 Suits against the United States may raise
separation of powers concerns, because they may result in federal judicial
orders entered against the other branches of the federal government. But
322

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
324
Id.
325
See supra note 150.
326
Pushaw, supra note 51, at 512–17. Professor Pushaw suggested from this difference that federal
justiciability doctrines should apply to controversies but not cases. Id. at 519–20. But he did so only
casually because resolving that question was not the focus of his paper; his goal was to show only that
cases should be treated differently from controversies, not to determine the precise content of the
justiciability doctrines to apply to those categories.
327
Further support for differing scope of jurisdiction for the different grants of jurisdiction comes
from an early draft of Article III that extended jurisdiction only to cases arising under federal law but to
all “disputes” in which the parties were diverse. 2 FARRAND, supra note 23, at 146–47 (emphasis
added).
328
See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (noting a
presumption that the same words in the same provision have the same meaning).
329
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
323
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there is still reason to align this grant of jurisdiction with state justiciability
rules. The grant of jurisdiction covers claims against the United States that
do not involve the Constitution or federal laws—if the claim involved those
laws, the suit would be covered by the arising under provision of Article
III. The reason for this grant of jurisdiction was that the state courts might
seek to promote their local interests over those of the national
government.330 Because the purpose of the grant of this jurisdiction was to
allow any suits that could be brought in state court to be brought in federal
court so as not to expose the United States to state bias, federal jurisdiction
over claims against the United States should be at least as broad as state
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Federal justiciability doctrines should not apply to state law suits
brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Instead, federal courts
should apply state justiciability doctrines in those cases. Applying state
justiciability doctrines would better achieve diversity jurisdiction’s goal of
providing an alternative forum for resolving state claims involving out-ofstate litigants, and it would not conflict with the reasons underlying federal
justiciability doctrines.
Of course, moving away from federal justiciability doctrines—which
tend to be more restrictive than state ones—to state justiciability could
increase federal interference with state affairs. But all diversity cases
involving state law present a threat to state sovereignty; whenever a federal
court hears such a case, it injects itself into state affairs. The decision to
include diversity jurisdiction in Article III reflects a determination that this
infringement on state sovereignty was not so troublesome as to preclude
federal intervention to prevent bias against out-of-state litigants.
One might think that tinkering with justiciability in diversity cases is
unnecessary because state courts do not exhibit the bias that motivated
diversity jurisdiction.331 State courts today are not known for discriminating

330

THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 2, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton); see Pushaw supra note
51, at 522 n. 353.
331
The absence of bias has led to criticism of diversity as an unwarranted burden on the federal
judiciary. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 523–27 (1928) (arguing for the curtailment of diversity jurisdiction).
This criticism, however, has generally pressed for limits by statute, not by interpretation of Article III.
Id. at 523 (“[T]he obvious abuses of diversity jurisdiction should be promptly removed by
legislation . . . .”). See generally MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
COURTS 219 (2d. ed. 2011) (“While judicial attitudes toward diversity jurisdiction may influence the
way judges resolve a close case regarding its scope, most of the debate is directed at Congress . . . .”).
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against out-of-state litigants.332 But that sense of the state courts may be
wrong.333 The perception of fairness may be attributable to our inability to
detect when local prejudice affects judgments. Or the lack of bias exhibited
by state courts may be due in part to the existence of diversity jurisdiction;
states might act more fairly to avoid losing cases to federal court.
Moreover, that the states are fair today is no guarantee that they will be so
tomorrow. That possibility counsels against reading the Constitution to
restrict justiciability in diversity cases. If there is insufficient risk of bias to
warrant federal jurisdiction, Congress has the power to limit federal
jurisdiction. But the Constitution should not be read to preclude federal
courts from hearing those claims in the event that Congress concludes that
federal intervention is necessary.

332

See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 40
(1990), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf [http://
perma.cc/GM85-8VBP] (concluding that bias against out-of-state litigants is not a significant problem).
333
See, e.g., Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 384 (1992) (arguing that bias is perceived in
more rural states).
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